PROCLUS, THE PLATONIC SUCCESSOR,
on the Theology of Plato.
Translated by Thomas Taylor
BOOK I
Chapter I
O PERICLES, to me the dearest of friends, I am of opinion that the
whole philosophy of Plato was at first unfolded into light through the
beneficent will of superior natures, exhibiting the intellect concealed
in them, and the truth subsisting, together with beings, to souls conversant
with generation (so far as it is lawful for them to participate of such
supernatural and mighty good); and again, that afterwards having received
its perfection, returning as it were into itself and becoming unapparent
to many who professed to philosophize; and who earnestly desired to engage
in the investigation of true being, it again advanced into light. But I
particularly think that the mystic doctrine respecting divine concerns,
which is purely established on a sacred foundation, and which perpetually
subsists with the gods themselves, became thence apparent to such as are
capable of enjoying it for a time, through one man, whom I should not err
in calling the primary leader and hierophant of those true mysteries, into
which souls separated from terrestrial places are initiated, and of those
entire and stable visions, which those participate who genuinely embrace
a happy and blessed life. But this philosophy shone forth at first from
him so venerably and arcanely, as if established in sacred temples, and
within their adyta, and being unknown to many who have entered into these
holy places, in certain orderly periods of time, proceeded as much as was
possible for it into light, through certain true priests, and who embraced
a life corresponding to the tradition of such mystic concerns. It appears
likewise to me, that the whole place became splendid, and that illuminations
of divine spectacles everywhere presented themselves to the view.
These interpreters of the epopteia (or mystic speculations)
of Plato, who have unfolded to us all-sacred narrations of divine concerns,
and who were allotted a nature similar to their leader, I should determine
to be the Egyptian Plotinus, and those who received the theory from him,
I mean Amelius and Porphyry, together with those in the third place who
were produced like virile statues from these, viz.: Iamblichus and
Theodorus, and others, who after these, following this divine choir, have
energized about the doctrine of Plato with a divinely-inspired mind. From
these, he who, after the gods, has been our leader to everything beautiful
and good, receiving in an undefiled manner the most genuine and pure light
of truth in the bosom of his soul, made us a partaker of all the rest of
Plato's philosophy, communicated to us that arcane information which he
had received from those more ancient than himself, and caused us, in conjunction
with him, to be divinely agitated about the mystic truth of divine concerns.
To this man, therefore, should we undertake to return thanks adequate
to the benefits which we have received from him; the whole of time would
not be sufficient. But if it is necessary, not only' that we should have
received from others the transcendent good of the Platonic philosophy,
but that we should leave to posterity monuments of those blessed spectacles
of which we have been spectators, and emulators to the utmost of our ability,
under a leader the most perfect of the present time, and who arrived at
the summit of philosophy; perhaps we shall act properly in invoking the
gods, that they will enkindle the light of truth in our soul, and in supplicating
the attendants and ministers of better natures to direct our intellect
and lead it to the all-perfect, divine and elevated, end of the Platonic
theory. For I think that everywhere be who participates in the least degree
of intelligence, will begin his undertakings from the Gods, and especially
in explications respecting the Gods: for we can no otherwise be able to
understand a divine nature than by being perfected through the light of
the Gods; nor divulge it to others unless governed by them, and exempt
from multiform opinions, and the variety which subsists in words, preserving
at be same time the interpretation of divine names. Knowing therefore this,
and complying with the exhortation of the Platonic Timaeus, we in the first
place establish the Gods as leaders of the doctrine respecting themselves.
But may they in consequence of hearing our prayers be propitious to us,
and benignantly approaching, guide the intellect of our soul, and lead
it about the Vesta of Plato, and to the arduous sublimities of this speculation;
where, when arrived, we shall receive all the truth concerning them, and
shall obtain the best end of our parturient conceptions of divine concerns,
desiring to know something respecting them, inquiring about them of others,
and, at the same time, as far as we are able, exploring them ourselves
Chapter II
And thus much by way of preface. But it is necessary that I should
unfold the mode of the proposed doctrine, what it is requisite to expect
it will be, and define the preparatives which a bearer of it ought to possess;
that being properly adapted, he may approach, not to our discourses, but
to the intellectually elevated and deific philosophy of Plato. For it is
proper that convenient aptitudes of auditors should she proposed according
to the forms of discourses, lust as in the mysteries, those who are skillful
in concerns of this kind, previously prepare receptacles for the Gods,
and neither always use the same inanimate particulars, nor other animals,
nor men, in order to procure the presence of the divinities; but that alone
out of each of these which is naturally capable of participating divine
illumination, is by them introduced to the proposed mystic rites.
The present discourse, therefore, will first of all be divided by me
into three parts. In the beginning, considering all those common conceptions
concerning the Gods, which Plato summarily delivers, together with the
power and dignity everywhere of theological axioms; but in the middle of
this work, speculating the total orders of the Gods, enumerating their
peculiarities, defining their progressions after the manner of Plato, and
referring everything to the hypotheses of theologists; and, in the end,
speaking concerning the Gods which are in different places celebrated in
the Platonic writings, whether they are supermundane or mundane, and referring
the theory respecting them to the total genera of the divine orders.
In every part of this work, likewise, we shall prefer the clear, distinct,
and simple, to the contrary of these. And such things as are delivered
through symbol, we shall transfer to a clear doctrine concerning them;
but such as are delivered through images, we shall transmit to their exemplars.
Such things too as are written in a more affirmative way, we shall examine
by causal reasonings; but such as are composed through demonstrations,
we shall investigate; and besides this, explain the mode of truth which
they contain, and render it known to the hearers. And of things enigmatically
proposed, we shall elsewhere discover perspicuity, not from foreign hypotheses,
but from the most genuine writings of Plato. But with respect to the things
which immediately occur to the hearers, of these we shall contemplate the
consent with things themselves. And from all these particulars, one perfect
form of the Platonic theology will present itself to our view, together
with its truth which pervades through the whole of divine intellections,
and the one intellect which generated all the beauty of this theology and
the mystic evolution of this theory. Such, therefore, as I have said, will
be my present treatise.
But the auditor of the proposed dogmas is supposed to be adorned with
the moral virtues, and to be one who has bound by the reason of virtue
all the illiberal and inharmonious mo-tions of the soul, and harmonized
them to the one form of intellectual prudence: for, as Socrates says, it
is not lawful for the pure to be touched by the impure. But every vicious
man is perfectly impure; and the contrary character is pure. He must likewise
have been exercised in all the logical methods, and have contemplated many
irreprehensible conceptions about analyses, and many about divisions, the
contraries to these, agreeable, as it appears to me, to the exhortation
of Parmenides to Socrates. For prior to such a contest in arguments, the
knowledge of the divine genera, and of the truth established in them, is
difficult and impervious. But in the third place, he must not be unskilled
in physics. For he who has been conversant with the multiform opinions
of physiologists, and has after a manner explored in images the causes
of beings, will more easily advance to the nature of separate and primary
essences. An auditor therefore of the present work, as I have said, must
not be ignorant of the truth contained in the phenomena, nor unacquainted
with the paths of erudition, and the disciplines which they contain; for
through these we obtain a more immaterial knowledge of a divine essence.
But all these must be bound together in the leader intellect. Being likewise
a partaker of the dialectic of Plato, meditating those immaterial energies
which are separate from corporeal powers, and desiring to contemplate by
intelligence in conjunction with reason [true] beings, our auditor must
genuinely apply himself to the interpretation of divine and blessed dogmas,
and fill his soul, according to the Oracle, with profound love; since,
as Plato somewhere observes, for the apprehension of this theory a better
assistant than love cannot be obtained.
He must likewise be exercised in the truth which pervades through all
things, and must ex-cite his intelligible eye to real and perfect truth.
He must establish himself in a firm, immovable, and safe kind of divine
knowledge, and must be persuaded not to admire anything else, nor even
to direct his attention to other things, but must hasten to divine light
with an intrepid reasoning energy, and with the power of an unwearied life;
and in short, must propose to himself such a kind of energy and rest as
becomes him to possess who intends to be such a coryphaeus as Socrates
describes in the Theaetetus. Such then is the magnitude of our hypothesis,
and such the mode of the discourses about it. Before, however, I enter
on the narration of the things proposed, I wish to speak about theology
itself, its different modes, and what theological forms Plato approves,
and what he rejects; and these being previously known, we may more easily
learn in what follows, the auxiliaries of the demonstrations themselves.
Chapter III
All, therefore, that have ever touched upon theology, have called things
first, according to nature, Gods; and have said that the theological science
is conversant about these. And some, indeed, have considered a corporeal
science, as that alone which has any existence, and have placed in a secondary
rank with respect to essence, all the genera of incorporeal natures, considering
the principles of things as having a corporeal form, and evincing that
the habit in us by which we know these, is corporeal. But others, suspending
indeed all bodies from incorporeal natures, and defining the first hyparxis
[hyparxis, is the summit of any nature, or blossom, as it were, of its
essence] to be in soul, and the powers of soul, call (as appears to
me) the best of souls, Gods; and denominate the science which proceeds
as far as to these, and which knows these, theology. But such as produce
the multitude of souls from another more ancient principle, and establish
intellect as the leader of wholes, these assert that the best end is a
union of the soul with intellect, and consider the intellectual form of
life as the most honorable of all things. They doubtless too consider theology,
and the discussion of intellectual essence, as one and the same. All these,
therefore, as I have said, call the first and most self-sufficient principles
of things, Gods, and the science respecting these, theology.
The divine narration, however, of Plato alone, despises all corporeal
natures, with reference to principles. Because, indeed, everything divisible
and endued with interval, is naturally unable either to produce or preserve
itself, but possesses its being, energy, and passivity through soul, and
the motions which soul contains. But Plato demonstrates that the psychical
essence [i.e., the essence pertaining to soul] is more ancient than bodies,
but is suspended from an intellectual hypostasis [foundation]. For
everything which is moved according to time, though it may be self-moved,
is indeed of a more ruling nature than things moved by others, but is posterior
to an eternal motion. He shows, therefore, as we have said, that intellect
is the father and cause of bodies and souls, and that all things both subsist
and energize about it, which are allotted a life conversant with transitions
and evolutions.
Plato, however, proceeds to another principle entirely exempt from
intellect, more incorporeal and ineffable, and from which all things, even
though you should speak of such as are last, have necessarily a subsistence.
For all things are not naturally disposed to participate in soul, but such
things only are allotted in themselves a more clear or obscure life. Nor
are all things able to enjoy intellect and being, but such only as subsist
according to form. But it is necessary that the principle of all things
should be participated by all things, if it does not desert anything, since
it is the cause of all things which in any respect are said to have a subsistence.
Plato having divinely discovered this first principle of wholes, which
is more excellent than intellect, and is concealed in inaccessible recesses;
and having exhibited these three causes and monads, their proper numbers;
one multitude indeed being uniform [this word, whenever it appears in
this translation, signifies that which is characterized by unity],
but the second intellectual, and the third psychical. For every monad [whole
or unity] is the leader of a multitude coordinate to itself. But as Plato
connects bodies with soul, so likewise he connects souls with intellectual
forms, and these again with the unities of beings. But he converts all
things to one imparticipable unity. And having run back as far as to this
unity, he considers himself as having obtained the highest end of the theory
of wholes; and that this is the truth respecting the Gods. Which is conversant
with the unities of beings, and which delivers their progressions and peculiarities,
the contact of beings with them, and the orders of forms which are suspended
from these unical [of the nature of one] hypostases [foundations].
But he teaches us that the theory respecting intellect, and the forms
and the genera revolving about intellect, is posterior to the science which
is conversant with the Gods themselves. Likewise that the intellectual
theory apprehends intelligibles, and the forms which are capable of being
known by the soul through the projecting energy of intellect; but that
the theological science transcending this, is conversant with arcane and
ineffable hyparxes, and pursues their separation from each other, and their
unfolding into light from one cause of all: whence I am of opinion, that
the intellectual peculiarity of the soul is capable of apprehending intellectual
forms, and the difference which subsists in them, but that the summit,
and, as they say, flower of intellect and hyparxix, is conjoined with the
unities of beings, and through these, with the occult union of all the
divine unities. For as we contain many gnostic powers, through this alone
we are naturally capable of being with and participating this occult union.
For the genus of the Gods cannot be apprehended by sense, because it is
exempt from all bodies; nor by opinion and dianoia [the discursive energy
of reason, or the power of the soul that reasons scientifically], for
these are divisible and come into contact with multiform concerns; nor
by intelligence in conjunction with reason, for knowledge of this kind
belongs to true beings; but the hyparxix of the Gods rides on beings, and
is defined according to the union itself of wholes. It remains, therefore,
if it be admitted that a divine nature can be in Any respect known, that
it must be apprehended by the hyparxix of the soul, and through this, as
far as it is possible, be known. For we say that everywhere things similar
can be known by the similar; viz. The sensible by sense, the doxastic [the
object of opinion] by opinion, the dianoetic by dianoia, and the intelligible
by intellect. So that the most unical nature must be known by the one,
and the ineffable by that which is ineffable.
Indeed, Socrates in the [first] Alcibiades rightly observes, that the
soul entering into herself will behold all other things, and deity itself.
For verging to her own union, and to the center of all life, laying aside
multitude, and the variety of all manifold powers which she contains, she
ascends to the highest watchtower of beings. And as in the most holy of
the mysteries, they say, that the mystics at first meet with the multiform,
and many-shaped [e.g., evil daemons] genera, which are hurled forth
before the Gods, but on entering the interior parts of the temple, unmoved,
and guarded by the mystic rite, they genuinely receive in their bosom divine
illumination, and divested of their garments, as they would say, participate
of a divine nature; - the same mode, as it appears to me, takes place in
the speculation of wholes. For the soul when looking at things posterior
to herself, beholds the shadows and images of beings, but when she converts
herself to herself she evolves her own essence, and the reasons which she
contains. And at first indeed, she only as it were beholds herself; but
when she penetrates more profoundly into the knowledge of herself, she
finds in herself both intellect, and the orders of beings. When however,
she proceeds into her interior recesses, and into the adytum [holy of
holies, inner sanctum] as it were of the soul, she perceives with her
eye closed, the genus of the Gods, and the unities of beings. For all things
are in us psychically, and through this we are naturally capable of knowing
all things, by exciting the powers and the images of wholes which we contain.
And this is the best employment of our energy, to be extended to divine
nature itself, having our powers at rest, to revolve harmoniously round
it, to excite all the multitude of the soul to this union, and laying aside
all such things as are posterior to the one, to become seated and
conjoined with that which is ineffable, and beyond all things. For it is
lawful for the soul to ascend, till she terminates her flight in the principle
of things; but arriving thither, beholding the place which is there, descending
thence, and directing her course through beings; likewise evolving the
multitude of forms, exploring their monads and their numbers, and apprehending
intellectually how each is suspended from its proper unity, we may consider
her as possessing the most perfect science of divine natures, perceiving
in a uniform manner the progressions of the Gods into beings, and the distinctions
of beings about the Gods. Such then according to Plato's decision is our
theologist; and theology is a habit of this kind, which unfolds the hyparxis
itself of the Gods, separates and speculates their unknown and unical light
from the peculiarity of their participants, and announces it to such as
are worthy of this energy, which is both blessed and comprehends all things
at once.
Chapter IV
After the all-perfect comprehension of the first theory, we must deliver
the modes according to which Plato teaches us mystic conceptions of divine
natures. For he appears not to have pursued everywhere the same mode of
doctrine about these; but sometimes according to a deific energy, and at
other times dialectically, he evolves the truth concerning them. And sometimes
he symbolically announces their ineffable peculiarities, but at other times
recurs to them from images, and discovers in them the primary causes of
wholes. For in the Phaedrus being inspired by the Nymphs, and having exchanged
human intelligence for a better possession, fury, he unfolds with a divine
mouth many arcane dogmas concerning the intellectual Gods, and many concerning
the liberated rulers of the universe, who lead upwards the multitude of
mundane Gods to the monads which are intelligible and separate from [mundane]
wholes. But relating still more about those gods who are allotted the world,
he celebrates their intellections, and mundane fabrications, their unpolluted
providence and government of souls, and whatever else Socrates delivers
entheastically [or according to divinely-inspired energy] in that
dialog, as he clearly asserts, ascribing at the same time this fury to
the deities of the place.
But in the Sophista, dialectically contending about being, and the
separate hypostasis of the one from beings, and doubting against
those more ancient than himself, he shows how all beings are suspended
from their cause, and the first being, but that being itself participates
of the unity which is exempt from the whole of things, that it is a passive
one, but not the one itself, being subject to and united to the
one, but not being that which is primarily one. In a similar manner
too, in the Parmenides, he unfolds dialectically the progressions of being
from the one, and the transcendency of the one, through the
first hypotheses, and this, as he asserts in that dialog, according to
the most perfect division of this method. And again, in the Gorgias, he
relates the fable concerning the three demiugi [or fabricators]
and their demiurgic allotment, which indeed is not only a fable, but a
true narration. But in the Banquet, he speaks concerning the union of Love.
And in the Protagoras, about the distribution of mortal animals from the
Gods; in a symbolical manner concealing the truth respecting divine natures,
and as far as to mere indication unfolding his mind to the most genuine
of his hearers.
If likewise, you are willing that I should mention the doctrine delivered
through the mathematical disciplines, and the discussion of divine concerns
from ethical or physical discourses, of which many may be contemplated
in the Timaeus, many in the dialog called the Politicus, and many may seen
scattered in other dialogs; here likewise to you who are desirous of knowing
divine concerns through images, the method will be apparent. For all these
shadow forth the powers of things divine. The Politicus, for instance,
the fabrication in the heavens. But the figures of the five elements delivered
in geometric proportions in the Timaeus, represent in images the peculiarities
of the Gods who ride on the parts of the universe. And the divisions of
the psychical essence in that dialog shadow forth the total orders of the
Gods.
I omit to mention that Plato composes polities, assimilating them to
divine natures. And to the whole world, and adorns them from the powers
which it contains. All these therefore, through the similitude of mortal
to divine concerns, exhibit to us in images, the progressions, orders,
and fabrications of divine natures. And such are the modes of theologic
doctrine employed by Plato.
It is evident however, from what has been already said, that they are
necessarily so many in number. For those who treat of divine concerns in
an indicative manner, either speak symbolically and fabulously, or through
images. But of those who openly announce their conceptions, some frame
their discourses according to science, but others according to inspiration
from the Gods. And he who desires to signify divine concerns through symbols
is Orphic, and in short, accords with those who write fables concerning
the Gods. But he who does this through images is Pythagoric. For the mathematical
disciplines were invented by the Pythagoreans, in order to a reminiscence
of divine concerns, at which, through these as images they endeavor to
arrive. For they refer both numbers and figures to the Gods, according
to the testimony of their historians. But the entheastic character, or
he who is under the influence of divine inspiration, unfolding the truth
by itself the Gods, most perspicuously ranks among the highest initiators.
For these do not think proper to unfold the divine orders, or their peculiarities
to their familiars, through certain veils, but announce their powers and
their numbers, in consequence of being moved by the Gods themselves. But
the traditions of divine concerns according to science, is the illustrious
prerogative of the philosophy of Plato. For Plato alone, as it appears
to me, of all those who are known to us, has attempted methodically to
divide and reduce into order, the regular progression of the divine genera,
their mutual difference, the common peculiarities of the total orders,
and the distributed peculiarities in each. But the truth of this will be
evident when we frame precedaneous demonstrations about the Parmenides,
and all the divisions which it contains.
At present we shall observe that Plato does not admit all the fabulous
figments of dramatic composition, but those only which have reference to
the beautiful and the good, and which are not discordant with a divine
essence. For that mythological mode which indicates divine concerns through
conjecture is ancient, concealing truth under a multitude of veils, and
proceeding in a manner similar to nature, which extends sensible fragments
of intelligibles, material, of immaterial, partible, of impartible natures,
and images, and things which have a false being, of things perfectly true.
But Plato rejects the more tragical mode of mythologicizing of the ancient
poets, who thought proper to establish an arcane theology respecting the
Gods, and on this account devised wanderings, sections, battles, lacerations,
rapes and adulteries of the Gods, and many other such symbols of the truth
about divine natures, which this theology conceals; this mode he rejects,
and asserts that it is in every respect most foreign from erudition. But
he considers those mythological discourses about the Gods, as more persuasive,
and more adapted to truth and the philosophical habit, which assert that
a divine nature is the cause of all good, but of no evil, and that it is
void of all mutation, ever preserving its own order immutable, and comprehending
in itself the fountain of truth, but never becoming the cause of any deception
to others. For such types of theology, Socrates delivers in the Republic.
All the fables therefore of Plato, guarding the truth in concealment,
have not even their externally apparent apparatus discordant with our undisciplined
and unperverted anticipation respecting the Gods. But they bring with them
an image of the mundane composition, in which both the apparent beauty
is worthy of divinity, and a beauty more divine than this, is established
in the unapparent lives and powers of the Gods. This therefore, is one
of the mythological modes respecting divine concerns, which from the apparently
unlawful, irrational, and inordinate, passes into order and bound, and
regards as its scope the composition of the beautiful and good.
But there is another mode which he delivers in the Phaedrus. And this
consists in everywhere preserving theological fables, unmixed with physical
narrations, and being careful in no respect to confound or exchange theology,
and the physical theory with each other. For, as a divine essence is separate
from the whole of nature, in like manner, it is perfectly proper that discourses
respecting the Gods should be pure from physical disquisitions. For a mixture
of this kind is, says he, laborious; and to make physical passions the
end of mythological conjecture, is the employment of no very good man;
such for instance, as considering through his [pretended] wisdom, Chimera,
Gorgon, and things of a similar kind, as the same with physical figments.
Socrates, in the Phaedrus, reprobating this mode of mythologizing, represents
its patron as saying under the figure of a fable, that Orithya sporting
with the wind Borcas, and being thrown down the rocks, means nothing more,
than that Orithya who was a mortal, was ravish3ed by Borcas through love.
For it appears to me, that fabulous narrations about the gods, should always
have their concealed meaning more venerable than the apparent. So that
if certain persons introduce to us physical hypotheses of Platonic fables,
and such as are conversant with sublunary affairs, we must say that they
entirely wander from the intention of the philosopher, and that those hypotheses
alone, are interpreters of the truth contained in these fables, which have
for their scope, a divine, immaterial, and separate hypostasis, and which
looking to this, make the compositions and analyses of the fables, adapted
to our inherent anticipations of divine concerns.
Chapter V
As we have therefore enumerated all these modes of the Platonic theology,
and have shown what compositions and analyses of fables are adapted to
the truth respecting the Gods, let us consider, in the next place, whence,
and from what dialogs principally, we think the dogmas of Plato concerning
the Gods may be collected, and by a speculation of what types or forms
we may be able to distinguish his genuine writings, from those spurious
compositions which are ascribed to him.
The truth then concerning the Gods pervades, as I may say, through
all the Platonic dialogs, and in all of them conceptions of the first philosophy,
venerable, clear, and supernatural, are disseminated, in some indeed, more
obscurely, but in others more conspicuously; conceptions which excite those
that are in any respect able to participate of them, to the immaterial
and separate essence of the Gods. And, as in each part of the universe,
and in nature herself, the demiurgus of all that the world contains, established
resemblances of the unknown hyparxis of the Gods, that all things might
be converted to a divine nature, through their alliance with it, in like
manner I am of opinion, that the divine intellect of Plato weaves conceptions
about the Gods in all his writing, and leaves nothing deprived of the mention
of divinity, that from the whole of them, a reminiscence of wholes may
be obtained, and imparted to the genuine lovers of divine concerns.
If however, it be requisite to lay before the reader those dialogs
out of many, which principally unfold to us the mystic discipline about
the Gods, I should not err in ranking among this number, the Phaedo and
Phaedrus, the Banquet, and the Philebus, and together with these, the Sophista
and Politicus, the Cratylus and the Timaeus. For all these are full through
the whole of themselves, as I may say, of the divine science of Plato.
But I should place in the second rank after these, the fable in the Gorgias,
and that in the Pretagoras; likewise the assertions about the providence
of the Gods in the Laws, and such things as are delivered about the Fates,
or the mother of the Fates, or the circulations of the universe, in the
tenth book of the Republic. Again, you may, if you please, place in the
third rank those Epistles, through which we may be able to arrive at the
science about divine natures. For in these, mention is made of the three
kings; and very many other divine dogmas worthy the Platonic theory are
delivered. It is necessary therefore, looking to these, to explore in these
each order of the Gods.
Thus from the Philebus, we may receive the science respecting the one
good, and the two first principles of things, together with the triad which
is unfolded into light from these. For you will find all these distinctly
delivered to us by Plato in that dialog. But from the Timaeus, you may
obtain the theory about intelligibles, a divine narration about the demiurgic
monad; and the most full truth about the mundane Gods. But from the Phaedrus,
[you may acquire a scientific knowledge of] all the intelligible genera,
and of the liberated orders of Gods, which are proximately established
above the celestial circulations. From the Politicus, you may obtain the
theory of the fabrication in the heavens, of the uneven periods of the
universe, and of the intellectual causes of those periods. But from the
Sophista, the whole sublunary region, and preside over its generations
and corruptions. But with respect to each of the Gods, we may obtain many
conceptions adapted to sacred concerns from the Banquet, many from the
Cratylus, and many from the Phaedo. For in each of these dialogs, more
or less mention is made of divine names, from which it is easy for those
who are exercised in divine concerns to discover by a reasoning process
the peculiarities of each.
It is necessary however, to evince that each of the dogmas accords
with Platonic principles, and the mystic traditions of theologists. For
all the Grecian theology is the progeny of the mystic tradition of Orpheus;
Pythagoras first of all learning from Aglaophemus the orgies of the Gods,
but Plato in the second place receiving an all-perfect science of the divinities
from the Pythagorean and Orphic writings. For in the Philebus referring
the theory about the two species of principles [bound and infinity] to
the Pythagoreans, he calls them men dwelling with the Gods, and truly blessed.
Philolaus therefore, the Pythagorean, has left us in writing many admirable
conceptions about these principles, celebrating their common progression
into beings, and their separate fabrication of things. But in the Timaeus,
Plato endeavoring to teach us about the sublunary Gods, and their order,
flies to theologists, calls them the sons of the Gods, and makes them the
fathers of the truth about those divinities. And lastly, he delivers the
orders of the sublunary Gods proceeding from wholes, according to the progression
delivered by them of the intellectual kings. Again in the Cratylus he follows
the traditions of theologists, respecting the order of the divine progressions.
But in the Gorgias, he adopts the Homeric dogma, respecting the triadic
hypostasis of the demiurgi. And in short, he everywhere discourses concerning
the Gods agreeably to the principles of theologists; rejecting indeed,
the tragical part of mythological fiction, but establishing first hypotheses
in common with the authors of fables.
Chapter VI
Perhaps, however, someone may here object to us, that we do not in
a proper manner exhibit the everywhere dispersed theology of Plato, and
that we endeavor to heap together different particulars from different
dialogs, as if we were studious of collecting together many things into
one mixture, instead of deriving them all from one and the same fountain.
For if this were the case, we might refer different dogmas to different
treatises of Plato, but we shall by no means have a precedaneous doctrine
concerning the Gods, nor will there be any dialog which presents us with
an all-perfect and entire procession of the divine genera, and their coordination
with each other. But we shall be similar to those who endeavor to obtain
a whole from parts, through the want of a whole prior to parts, and to
weave together the perfect from things imperfect; when, on the contrary,
the imperfect ought to have the first cause of its generation in the perfect.
For the Timaeus, for instance, will teach us the theory of the intelligible
genera; and the Phaedrus appears to present us with a methodical account
of the first intellectual orders. But where will be the coordination of
intellectuals to intel1igibles? And what will be the generation of second
from first natures? In short, after what manner the progression of the
divine orders takes place from the one principle of all things, and how
in the generations of the Gods, the orders between the one, and
a11-perfect number, are filled up, we shall be unable to evince.
Farther still, it may be said, where will be the venerableness of your
boasted science about divine natures? For it is absurd to call them dogmas
which are collected from many places Platonic; and which, as you acknowledge,
are introduced from foreign names to the philosophy of Plato; nor are you
able to evince one whole entire truth about divine natures. Perhaps, indeed,
they will say, certain persons, junior to Plato, have delivered in their
writings, and left to their disciples, one perfect form of theology. You,
therefore, are able to produce one entire theory about nature from the
Timaeus; but from the Republic, or Laws, the most beautiful dogmas about
manners, and which tend to one form of philosophy. Alone, therefore, neglecting
the treatise of Plato, which contains all the good of the first philosophy,
and which may be called the summit of the whole theory, you will be deprived
of the most perfect knowledge of beings, unless you are so much infatuated,
as to boast on account of fabulous fictions, though an analysis of things
of this kind abounds with much of the probable, but not of the demonstrative.
Besides, things of kind are only delivered adventitiously in the Platonic
dialogues; as the fable in the Protegoras, which is inserted for the sake
of the politic science, and the demonstrations respecting it. In like manner,
the fable in the Republic is inserted for the sake of justice; but in the
Gorgias, for the sake of temperance. For Plato combines fabulous narrations
with investigations of ethical dogmas, not for the sake of the fables,
but for the sake of the leading design, that we may not only exercise the
intellectual part of the soul, through contending reasons, but that the
divine part of the soul may more perfectly receive the knowledge of beings,
through its sympathy with more mystic concerns. For, from other discourses,
we appear similar to those who are compelled to the reception of truth;
but from fables we suffer in an ineffable manner, and call forth our unperverted
conceptions, venerating the mystic information which they contain.
Hence, as it appears to me, Timaeus with great propriety thinks it
fit that we should produce the divine genera, following the inventors of
fables as the sons of the Gods, and subscribe to their always generating
secondary natures from such as are first, though they should speak without
demonstration. For this kind of discourse is not demonstrative, but enthusiastic
and was invented by the ancients, not through necessity, but for the sake
of persuasion, not regarding mere discipline, but sympathy with things
themselves. But if you are willing to speculate not only the causes of
fables, but of other theological dogmas, you will find that some of them
are scattered in the Platonic dialogues for the sake of ethical, and others
for the sake of physical considerations. For in the Philebus, Plato discourses
concerning bound and the infinite, for the sake of pleasure and life according
to intellect. For I think the latter are species of the former. In the
Timaeus, the discourse about the intelligible Gods, is assumed for the
sake of the proposed physiology. On which account it is everywhere necessary
that images should be known from paradigms; but that the paradigms of material
things should be immaterial, of sensibles, intelligible, and that the paradigms
of physical forms should be separate.
But again in the Phaedrus, Plato celebrates the supercelestial place,
the subcelestial profundity, and every genus under this, for the sake of
amatory mania: the manner in which the reminiscence of souls takes place,
and the passage to these from hence. But everywhere, as I may say, the
leading end is either physical or political, while the conceptions about
divine natures take place, either for the sake of invention or perfection.
How, therefore, can such a theory as yours be any longer venerable and
supernatural, and worthy to be studied beyond everything, when it is neither
able to evince the whole in itself, nor the perfect, nor that which is
precedaneous in the writings of Plato, but is destitute of all these, is
violent and not spontaneous, and does not possess a genuine, but an adventitious
order, as in a drama? And such are the objections which may be urged against
our design.
Chapter VII
I, however, to an objection of this kind, shall make a just and perspicuous
reply. I say then, that Plato everywhere discourses about the Gods agreeably
to ancient rumor, and to the nature of things. And sometimes indeed, for
the sake of the cause of the things proposed, he reduces them to the principles
of the dogmas; and thence, as from a watchtower, contemplates the nature
of the thing proposed. But sometimes he establishes the theological science
as the leading end. For in the Phaedrus his subject respects intelligible
beauty and the participation of beauty pervading from thence through all
things; and in the Banquet it respects the amatory order.
But if it be necessary to survey in one Platonic dialogue, the all-perfect
Act, whole, and connected, extending as far as to the complete number of
theology, I shall perhaps assert a paradox, and which will alone be apparent
to our familiars. We ought however to dare, since we have entered on such
like arguments, and affirm against our opponents, that the Parmenides,
and the mystic conceptions it contains, will accomplish all you desire.
For in this dialog all the divine genera proceed in order from the first
cause, and evince their mutual connection and dependence on each other.
And those whicb are highest indeed, connate with the one, and of
a primary nature, are allotted a unical, occult and simple form of hyparsis;
but such as are last, are multiplied, are destributed into many parts,
and are exuberant in number, but inferior in power to such as are of a
higher order; and such as are middle, according to a convenient proportion,
are more composite than their causes, but more simple than their proper
progeny. And in short, all the axioms of the theologic science, appear
in perfection in this dialog, and all the divine orders are exhibited subsisting
in connection. So that this is notbing else than the celebrated generation
of the Gods, and the procession of every kind of being from the ineffable
and unknown cause of wholes. Tbe Parmenides, therefore, enkindles in the
lovers of Plato, the whole and perfect light of tbe theological science.
But aftcr this, the before-mentioned dialogs distribute parts of the mystic
discipline about the Gods, and all of them, as I may say, participate of
divine wisdom, and excite our spontaneous conceptions respecting a divine
nature. And it is necessary to refer all the parts of this mystic discipline
to these dialogs, and these again to the one and all-perfect theory of
the Parmenides. For thus, as it appears to me, we shall suspend the more
imperfect from the perfect, and parts from wholes, and shall exhibit reasons
assimilated to things, of which, according to the Platonic Timaeus, they
are interpreters. Such then is our answer to the objection which may be
urged against us; and thus we refer tbe Platonic theory to the Parmenides;
just as the Timaeus is acknowledged by all wbo are in the least degree
intelligent, to contain the whole science about nature.
Chapter VIII
I appear, however, by these means, to have excited for myself a two-fold
contest against those who attempt to investigate the writings of Plato;
and I see two sorts of persons, who will oppose what has been said. One
of these does not think proper to explore any other design in the Parmenides,
than exercise through opposite arguments, or to introduce in this dialog
a crowd of arcane and intellectual dogmas, which are foreign from its intentions.
But the other sort, who are more venerable than these, and lovers of forms
assert, that one of the hypotheses is about the first God, another about
the second God, and the whole of an intellectual nature, and a third, about
the natures posterior to this, whether they are the more excellent genera,
or souls, or any other kind of beings. For the investigation of these particulars
does not pertain to the present discourse.
These, therefore, distribute three of the hypotheses after this manner.
But they do not think proper to busy themselves about the multitude of
Gods, the intelligible, and the intellectual genera, the supermundane and
mundane natures, or to unfold all these by division, or busily explore
them. For according to them, though Plato in the second hypothesis, treats
about intellectual beings, yet the nature of intellect is one, simple and
indivisible. Against both these therefore, must he contend, who entertains
that opinion of the Parmenides, which we have before mentioned. The contest
however against these is not equal. But those who make the Parmenides a
logical exercise, are again attacked by those who embrace the divine mode
of interpretation. And those who do not unfold the multitude of beings,
and the orders of divine natures, are indeed, as Homer says, in every respect
venerable and skillful men, but yet for the sake of the Platonic philosophy,
we must doubt against them, following in this our leader to the most holy
and mystic truth. It is proper likewise to relate as far as contributes
to our purpose, what appears to us to be the truth respecting the hypotheses
of the Parmenides; for thus perhaps by a reasoning process, we may embrace
the whole theology of Plato.
Chapter IX
In the first place this, let us consider those, who draw down the design
of this dialog from the truth of things to a logical exercise, and see
whether they can possibly accord with the writings of Plato. It is therefore
evident to every one, that Parmenides proposes to himself to deliver in
reality the dialectic method, and that with this view he cursorily assumes
it in a similar manner in each of the things which have a real being, as,
in sameness, difference, similitude, dissimilitude, motion, and permanency,
etc.; exhorting at the same time, those who desire to discover the nature
of each of these in an orderly method, to this exercise, as to a great
contest. He likewise asserts that it was by no means an easy undertaking
to him who was so much advanced in years, assimilates himself to the Ibycean
horse, and presents us with every argument to prove that this method is
a serious undertaking, and not a contest consisting in mere words. How
therefore, is it possible, that we can refer to empty arguments those conceptions
about which the great Parmenides, evincing that they require much serious
discussion, composed this discourse? How likewise is it reasonable to suppose
that an aged man would busy himself with mere verbal contests, and that
he who loved to speculate the truth of things, would bestow so much study
on this method - he who considered everything else, as having no real existence,
and who ascended to the high watchtower of being itself? Indeed, he who
admits this must suppose that Parmenides is satirized by Plato in this
dialog, by thus representing him drawn down to juvenile contests, from
the most intellectual visions of the soul.
But if you are willing, let us consider in addition to the above, what
Parmenides promises, and on what subject engaging to speak, he entered
on this discussion. Was it not then about being according to his doctrine,
and the unity of all beings, to which extending himself, his design was
concealed from the vulgar, while he exhorts us to collect the multitude
of beings into one undivided union? If, therefore, this is the one being,
or that which is the highest, and which is perfectly established above
the reasons conversant with opinion, is it not absurd to confound dogmas
about intelligibles with doxastic arguments? For indeed, such a form of
discourse is not adapted to the hypothesis about true beings, nor does
the intellection of unapparent and separate causes harmonize with dialectic
exercises; but these differ from each other, so far as intellect is established
above opinion, as Timaeus informs us, and not Timaeus only, but likewise
the daemoniacal Aristotle, who, discoursing on a power of this kind, exhorts
us to make our investigations, neither about things perfectly unapparent
to us, nor about such as are more known.
It is far therefore from being the case, that Parmenides, who places
the science of beings above that which appears to be truth to those who
rank sense before intellect, should introduce doxastic knowledge to an
intellective nature, since a knowledge of this kind is dubious, various,
and unstable; or that he should speculate true being with this doxastic
wisdom, and inane discussion. For a serious form of knowledge does not
harmonize with that which is simple, nor the multiform with the uniform,
nor the doxastic with the intelligible.
But still further, nor must this be omitted, that such a mode of discourse
is perfectly foreign from the discussion of Parmenides. For he discourses
about all beings, and delivers the order of wholes, their progression beginning
from the one, and their conversion ending in the one. But
the argumentative method is very remote from scientific theory. Does it
not therefore appear, that Plato must have attributed a discordant hypothesis
to Parmenides, if it be said that he merely regards an exercise through
opposite arguments, and for the sake of the power employed in this exercise,
he excites the whole of this evolution of reasons? Indeed, it will be found
that in all the other dialogs, Plato attributes hypotheses to each of the
philosophers adapted to their peculiar tenets. Thus to Timaeus, he assigns
the doctrine about nature; to Socrates, that of a republic; to the Elean
guest, that about being; and to the priestess Diotima, that respecting
love. Afterwards, each of the other dialogs confines itself to those arguments
which are adapted to the writings of the principal person of the dialog.
But Parmenides alone will appear to us wise in his poems, and in his diligent
investigations of true being, but in the Platonic scene, he will be the
leader of a juvenile muse. This opinion, therefore, accuses Plato of dissimilitude
of imitation, though he himself condemns the poets, for ascribing to the
sons of the Gods a love of money, and a life subject to the dominion of
the passions. How, therefore, can we refer a discussion of doxastic and
empty arguments to the leader of the truth of beings?
But if it be necessary that omitting a multitude of arguments, we should
make Plato himself a witness of the proposed discussion, we will cite of
you please what is written in the Theaetitus and Sophista; for from these
dialogs what we assert will be apparent. In the Theaetitus then Socrates
being excited by a young man to a confusion of those who assert that being
is immoveable, attacks among these an opinion of this kind entertained
by Parmenides, and at the same time assigns the cause. "I blush,"
says he, "for Parmenides, who is one of these, more than for all the
rest; and I, when very young, was conversant with him when he was very
elderly, and he appeared to me to possess a certain profundity perfectly
generous. I am afraid therefore, lest we do not understand what has been
asserted, and much more am I fearful that we fall short of the meaning
of Parmenides." With great propriety therefore do we assert, that
the proposed discussion does not regard a logical exercise, and make this
the end of the whole, but that it pertains to the science of the first
principle of things. For how could Socrates using a power of this kind,
and neglecting the knowledge of things, testify that the discourse of Parmenides
possessed a depth perfectly generous? And what venerableness can there
be in adopting a method which proceeds doxastically through opposite reasons,
and in undertaking such an invention of arguments?
Again in the Sophists, exciting the Elean guest to a perspicuous evolution
of the things proposed by him, and evincing that he was now accustomed
to more profound discourses: "Inform me," says he, "whether
it is your custom to give a prolix discussion of a subject which you are
able to demonstrate to anyone by interrogations; I mean such discussions
as Parmenides himself formerly used, accompanied with all-beautiful reasons,
and of which I was an auditor when I was very young, and he was very elderly?
What reason can then be assigned, why we should not believe Socrates, when
he asserts that the arguments of Parmenides were all-beautiful, and possessed
a generous profundity, and why we should degrade the discussion of Parmenides,
hurl it from essence and being, and transfer it to a vulgar, trifling,
and empty contest, neither considering that discourses of this kind are
alone adapted to youth, nor regarding the hypothesis of being characterized
by the one, nor anything else which opposes such an opinion.
But I likewise think it is proper that the authors of this hypothesis,
should consider the power of dialectic, such as it is exhibited by Socrates
in the Republic; - how, as he says, it surrounds all disciplines like a
defensive enclosure, and elevates those that use it, to the good itself,
and the first unities, purifies the eye of the soul, establishes it in
true beings, and the one principle of all things, and ends at last in that
which is no longer hypothetical. For if the power of this dialectic is
so great, and the end of this path is so mighty, it is not proper to confound
doxastic arguments, with a method of this kind. For the former regards
the opinions of men, but the latter is called garrulity by the vulgar.
And the one is perfectly destitute of disciplinative science, but the other
is the defensive enclosure of such sciences, and the passage to it is through
these. Again the doxastic method of reasoning has for its end the apparent,
but the dialectic method endeavors to arrive at the one itself,
always employing for this purpose steps of ascent, and at last, beautifully
ends in the nature of the good
By no means therefore is it fit that we should draw down to doxtastic
arguments, a method which is established among the most accurate sciences.
For the merely logical method which presides over the demonstrative phantasy
is of a secondary nature and is alone pleased with contentious discussions;
but our dialectic, for the most part, employs divisions and analyses as
primary sciences, and as imitating the progression of beings from the
one, and their conversion to it again. But it likewise sometimes uses
definitions and demonstrations, and prior to these the definitive method,
and the dividing method prior to this. On the contrary the doxastic method
is deprived of the incontrovertible reasonings of demonstration. Is it
not, therefore, necessary that these powers must be separated from each
other, and that the discussion of Parmenides, which employs our dialectic,
must be free from the empty variety of mere argument, and must fabricate
its reasonings with a view to being itself, and not to that which
is apparent? And thus much may suffice in answer to those who reprobate
our hypotheses. For if all this cannot convince them, we shall in vain
endeavor to persuade them, and urge them to the speculation of things.
Chapter X
But a greater and more difficult contest remains for me, against those
lovers of the speculation of beings, who look to the science of first causes,
as the end proposed in the hypothesis of the Platonic Parmenides; and this
contest we will accomplish, if you please, by numerous and more known arguments.
And in the first place, we shall define what that is, about which our
discourse against them will be employed; for this, I think will render
the mystic doctrine of Plato concerning divine natures, apparent in the
highest degree. There are, therefore, nine hypotheses which are discussed
by Parmenides in this dialog, as we have evinced in our commentaries upon
it. And the five precedaneous hypotheses suppose that the one has
a subsistence, and through this hypothesis, that all beings, the mediums
of wholes, and the terminations of the progressions of things, may be supposed
to subsist. But the four hypotheses which follow them introduce the
one, not having a subsistence according to the exhortations of the
dialectic method, show that by taking away the one, all beings,
and such things as have an apparent existence, must be entirely subverted,
and propose to themselves the confutation of this hypothesis. And some
of the hypotheses evidently conclude everything according to reason, but
others (if I may be allowed the expression) perfectly evince things more
impossible than impossibilities; which circumstance some prior to us perceiving,
as it appears to me, necessarily to happen in these hypotheses, have considered
it as deserving discussion, in their treatises on this dialog.
With respect to the first of the hypotheses therefore, almost all agree
in asserting, that Plato through this celebrates the superessential principle
of wholes, as ineffable, unknown, and above all being. But all do not explain
the hypothesis posterior to this after the same manner. For the ancient
Platonists, and those who participated the philosophy of Plotinus assert
that an intellectual nature presents itself to the view in this hypothesis,
subsisting from the superessential principle of things and endeavor to
harmonize to the one and all-perfect power of intellect, such conclusions
as are the result of this hypothesis. But that leader of ours to truth
about the Gods, and confabulator of Plato (that I may use the language
of Homer) who transferred what was indefinite in the theory of the more
ancient philosophers, to bound, and reduced the confusion of the different
orders to an intellectual distinction, in the writings which he communicated
to his associates; - this our leader in his treatise on the present subject,
calls upon us to adopt a distinct division of the conclusions, to transfer
this division to the divine orders, and to harmonize the first and most
simple of the things exhibited to the first of beings; but to adapt those
in the middle rank to middle natures, according to the order which they
are allotted among beings; and such as are last and multiform, to ultimate
progressions. For the nature of being is not one, simple, and indivisible;
but as in insensibles, the mighty heaven is one, yet it comprehends in
itself a multitude of bodies; and the monad connectedly contains multitude,
but in the multitude there is an order of progression; and of sensibles,
some are first, some middle, and some last; and prior to these, in souls,
from one soul a multitude of souls subsists, and of these, some are placed
in an order nearer, but others more remote from their wholeness, and others
again fill up the medium of the extremes; - in like manner, it is doubtless
necessary that among perfectly true beings, such genera as are uniform
and occult, should be established in the one and first cause of wholes,
but that others should proceed into all multitude, and a whole number,
and that others should contain the bond of these, in a middle situation.
It is likewise by no means proper to harmonize the peculiarities of first
natures with such as are second, nor of those that possess a subject order,
with such as are more unical, but it is requisite that among these, some
should have powers different from others, and that there should be an order
in this progression of true beings, and an unfolding of second from first
natures,
In short, being which subsists according to, or is characterized by
the one, proceeds indeed from the unity prior to beings, but generates
the whole divine genus, viz. the intelligible intellectual supermundane,
and that which proceeds as far as to the mundane order. But our preceptor
likewise asserts, that each of the conclusions is indicative of a divine
peculiarity. And though all the conclusions harmonize to all the progressions
of the one being, or of being characterized by the one, yet
I am of opinion, it is by no means wonderful that some conclusions should
more accord with some hypotheses than with others. For such things as express
the peculiarity of certain orders, do not necessarily belong to all the
Gods; but such as belong to all, are doubtless by a much greater reason
present with each. If therefore, we ascribe to Plato, an adventitious division
of the divine orders, and do not clearly evince that; in other dialogues,
be celebrates the progressions of the Gods from on high to the extremity
of things, sometimes in fables respecting the soul, and at other times,
in other theological modes, we shall absurdly attribute to him such a division
of being and together with this, of the progression of the one.
But if we can evince from other dialogs, that he (as will be manifest in
the course of this work) has celebrated all the kingdoms of the Gods, in
a certain respect, is it not impossible, that in the most mystic of all
his works, be should deliver through the first hypothesis, the exempt transcendency
of the one with respect to all the genera of beings, to being itself,
to a psychical essence, to form, and to matter, but that he should make
no mention of the divine progressions, and their orderly separation? For
if it is proper to contemplate last things on1y, why do we touch on the
first principle before other things? Or if we think fit to unfold the multitude
of the proper hypotheses, why do we pass by the genus of the Gods, and
the divisions which it contains? Or if we unfold the natures subsisting
between the first and last of things, why do we leave unknown the whole
orders of those divine beings, which subsist between the one, and
natures that are in any respect deified? For all these particulars evince,
that the whole discourse is defective, with respect to the science of things
divine.
But still farther, Socrates, in the Philebus, calls upon those that
love the contemplation of beings, to use the dividing method, and always
to explore the monads of total orders, and the duads, triads, or any other
numbers proceeding from these. If this then is rightly determined, it is
doubtless necessary that the Parmenides, which employs the whole dialectic
method, and discourses about being which is characterized by the one,
should neither speculate multitude about the one, nor remain in
the one monad of beings, nor in short, introduce to the one which
is above all beings, the whole multitude of first beings immediately, but
should unfold, as in the first order, such beings as have an occult subsistence,
and are allied to the one; but as in the middle rank, those genera
of the Gods which subsist according to progression, and which are more
divided than the extremely united, but are allotted a union more perfect,
than such as have proceeded to the utmost; and should unfold as in the
last rank, such as subsist according to the last division of powers, and
together with these, such as have a deified essence. If, therefore, the
first of the hypotheses is about the one which is above all multitude,
it is doubtless necessary that the hypothesis which follows this, should
not unfold being itself in an indefinite and indistinct manner, but should
deliver all the orders of beings. For the dividing method does not admit,
that we should introduce the whole of multitude at once to the one,
as Socrates teaches us in the Philebus.
Besides, we may evince the truth of what we assert from the very method
of the demonstrations. For the first of the conclusions become immediately
manifest from the least, most simple, most known, and as it were common
conceptions. But those which are next in order to these, become apparent
through a greater multitude of conceptions, and such as are more various.
And the last conclusions are entirely the most composite. For he always
uses the first conclusions, as subservient to the demonstration of those
that follow, and present us with an intellectual paradigm of the order
observed in geometry, or other disciplines, in the connection of these
conclusions with each other. If, therefore, discourses bring with them
an image of the things of which they are interpreters, and if, as are the
evolutions from demonstrations, such must the order necessarily be of the
things exhibited, it appears to me to be necessary, that such things as
derive their beginning from the most simple principles, must be in every
respect of a more primary nature, and must be arranged as conjoined with
the one; but that such as are always multiplied, and suspended from
various demonstrations, must have proceeded farther from the subsistence
of the one.
For the demonstrations which have two conclusions, must necessarily
contain the conclusions prior to themselves; but those which contain primary,
spontaneous, and simple conceptions, are not necessarily united with such
as are more composite, which are exhibited through more abundant media,
and which are farther distant from the principle of beings. It appears
therefore, that some of the conclusions are indicative of more divine orders,
but others, of such as are more subordinate; some, of more united, and
others, of more multiplied orders; and again, some, of more uniform, and
others, of more multiform progressions. For demonstrations are universally
from causes, and things first. If, therefore, first are the causes of second
conclusions, there is an order of causes and things caused, in the multitude
of the conclusions. For, indeed, to confound all things, and speculate
them indefinitely in one, neither accords with the nature of things, nor
the science of Plato.
Chapter XI
Again, therefore, let us discuss this affair in another way, and view
with the dianoetic power, where anything futile is delivered. For let it
be said, if you please, and we will first of all allow it, that the conclusions
of this second hypothesis are about true being. But as this is multitude,
and not only one itself, like the one prior to beings; for being
is that which is passive to the one, as the Elean guest in the Sophista
informs us; and as it is universally acknowledged by our opponents, who
establish that which is first as the one, but intellect, as one
many, soul, as one and many, and body, as many and one;
therefore, this has been asserted a thousand times, I mean that in true
being there is multitude together with union, whether will they say that
these things harmonize with the whole of being, but not with its parts,
or both with the whole and its parts? And again, we ask them whether they
attribute all things to each part of being or whether they ascribe different
things to different parts?
If, therefore, they are of opinion, that each particular should alone
harmonize with the whole of being, being will consist of non-beings, that
which is moved, of things immoveable, that which abides, of things deprived
of permanency, and universally, all things will consist of their opposites,
and we shall no longer agree with the discourse of Parmenides, who says
that the parts of being characterized by the one, are in a certain
respect wholes, and that each of them is one and being, in a manner similar
to the whole. But if we attribute all things to each part, and there is
nothing which we do not make all things, how can the summit of being, and
that which is most eminently one, contain a wholeness, and an incomprehensible
multitude of parts? How can it at one and the same time contain the whole
of number, figure, motion and permanency, and in short all forms and genera?
For these differ from each other, and the hypothesis will assert things
impossible. For things near to, will be similarly multiplied with things
remote from the one, and that which is first, will not be a less
multitude than that which is last; nor again, will the last of things be
a less one than the first, and things in the middle will have no difference
with respect to division from the extremes.
As therefore, it is not proper to ascribe all this multitude of conclusions
to the whole alone, nor to consider all things in a similar manner in all
the parts of being, it remains that different conclusions must harmonize
with different things It is necessary, therefore, that either the enumeration
of the conclusions should be inordinate, or ordinate. But if they say they
are inordinate, they neither speak agreeably to the dialectic method, nor
to the mode of demonstrations, which always generate things secondary from
such as are first, nor to the science of Plato, which always accompanies
the order of things. But if they say the conclusions are regular, I think
it is entirely necessary, that they should either begin from things first
according to nature, or from things last. But if from things last being
characterized by the one will be the last, and that which is moved
according to time, the first. This, however, is impossible. For that which
participates of time, must by a much greater priority participate of first
being. But that which participates of first being, does not necessarily
participate of time. First being, therefore, is above time. If then Plato
begins from first being, but ends in that which participates of time, he
proceeds supernally from the first to the last parts of true being. Hence,
the first conclusions are to be referred to the first orders, the middle,
for the same reason, to the middle orders, and the last, as is evident,
to such as are last. For it is necessary, as our discourse has evinced,
that different conclusions should be assigned to different things, and
that a distribution of this kind should commence from such things as are
highest.
But likewise, the order of the hypotheses, as it appears to me, is
a sufficient argument of the truth of our assertion. For with us the
one which is exempt from all multitude, is allotted the first order,
and from this the evolution of all the arguments commences. But the second
order after this, is about true beings, and the unity which these participate.
And the third order in regular succession, is about soul. Whether, therefore,
is it about every soul or not? In answer to this, we shall observe, that
our leader Syrianus has beautifully shown, that the discourse about whole
souls is comprehended in the second hypothesis. If, therefore, the order
of these three hypotheses proceeds according to the nature of things, it
is evident that the second is produced from the first, and the last from
the second. For I would ask those who are not entirely unskilled in discourses
of this kind, what can be more allied to the one, than being characterized
by the one, which the first of the conclusions of the second hypothesis
unfolds? Or what can be more allied to soul, than that which participates
of time, which subsists divisibly, and which is the last thing exhibited
in this hypothesis? For the life of partial as well as of total souls is
according to time. And first being is that which first participates of
the one, and through its connection with being, has a redundant
hyparxis with respect to the imparticipable unity. But if this hypothesis
is the middle, and if we aptly harmonize the highest conclusions with things
highest, we should doubtless harmonize middles with middles. For this hypothesis
commencing from first being, proceeds through all the genera posterior
to it, till it ends in a nature participating of time.
But, farther, from the common confession of those interpreters of Plato,
who were skilled in divine concerns, we can demonstrate the same things
as we have above asserted. For Plotinus, in his book On Numbers,
enquiring whether beings subsist prior to numbers, or numbers prior to
beings, clearly asserts that the first being subsists prior to numbers,
and that it generates the divine number. But if this is rightly determined
by him, and being is generative of the first number, but number is produced
by being, it is not proper to confound the order of these genera, nor to
collect them into one hypostasis, nor, since Plato separately produces
first being, and separately number, to refer each of the conclusions to
the same order. For it is by no means lawful, that cause and the thing
caused, should have either the same power, or the same order: but these
are distinct from each other; and the science concerning them is likewise
distinct, and neither the nature, nor the definition of them is one and
the same.
But, after Plotinus, Porphyry in his treatise On Principles,
evinces by many and beautiful arguments, that intellect is eternal, but
that at the same time, it contains in itself something prior to the eternal,
and through which it is conjoined with the one. For the one
is above all eternity, but the eternal has a second, or rather third order
in intellect. For it appears to me to be necessary that eternity should
be established in the middle of that which is prior to the eternal, and
the eternal. But of this hereafter. At the same time, thus much may be
collected from what has been said, that intellect contains something in
itself better than the eternal. Admitting this, therefore, we ask the father
of this assertion, whether this something better than the eternal is not
only being characterized by the one, but is a whole and parts, and
all multitude, number and figure, that which is moved, and that which is
permanent; or whether we are to ascribe some of the conclusions to it,
but not others? For it is impossible that all these can accord with a nature
prior to eternity since every intellectual motion, and likewise permanency,
are established in eternity. But if we are to ascribe some of the conclusions
to it, and not others, it is evident that other orders in intellect are
to be investigated, and that each of the conclusions is to be referred
to that order, to which it appears particularly adapted. For intellect
is not one in number, and an atom, as it appeared to be to some of the
ancients, but it comprehends in itself the whole progression of first being.
But the third who makes for our purpose after these, is the divine
Iamblichus, who, in his treatise Concerning the Gods, accuses those
who place the genera of being in intelligibles, because the number and
variety of these is more remote from the one. But afterwards he
informs us where these ought to be placed. For they are produced in the
end of the intellectual order, by the Gods which there subsist. How the
genera of being, however, both are, and are not in intelligibles, will
be hereafter apparent. But if, according to his arrangement of the divine
orders, intelligibles are exempt from the genera of being, much more are
they exempt from similitude and dissimilitude, equality and inequality.
Each of the conclusions, therefore, ought not in a similar manner to be
accommodated to all things, so as to refer them to the whole breadth of
the intelligible, or intellectual order. Hence from what the best of the
interpreters have said, when philosophizing according to their own doctrines,
both the multitude of the divine orders, and of the Platonic arguments,
are to be considered as proceeding according to an orderly distinction.
In addition, likewise, to what has been said, this also may be asserted,
that we cannot, on any other hypothesis, obtain a rational solution of
the many doubts which present themselves on this subject, but shall ignorantly
ascribe what is rash and vain to this treatise of Plato. For in the first
place, why are there only so many conclusions, and neither more nor less?
For there are fourteen conclusions. But as there are so many, we cannot
assign the reason of this, unless we distribute them in conjunction with
things themselves. In the second place, neither shall we be able to find
the cause of the order of the conclusions with respect to each other,
and how some leave a prior, and others a posterior establishment, according
to the reason of science, unless the order of the conclusions proceeds
in conjunction with the progression of beings. In the third place, why
do some of the conclusions become known from things proximately demonstrated,
but others from preceding demonstrations? For that the one is a
whole and contains parts, is demonstrated from being, which is characterized
by the one; but its subsistence in itself and in another, is placed
in a proximate order, after the possession of figure, but is demonstrated
from whole and parts. Or why are some things often demonstrated, from two
of the particulars previously evinced, but others from one of them? For
we shall be ignorant of each of these, and shall neither be able scientifically
to speculate their number, nor their order, nor their alliance to each
other, unless following things themselves, we evince that this whole hypothesis
is a dialectic arrangement, proceeding from on high through all the middle
genera, as far as to the termination of first being.
Again, if we should say, that all the conclusions demonstrate syllogistically
only, in what respect shall we differ from those who assert that the whole
of this discussion consists of doxastic arguments, and only regards a mere
verbal contest? But if it is not only syllogistic, but likewise demonstrative,
it is doubtless necessary, that the middle should be the cause of, and
by nature prior to the conclusion. As, therefore, we make the conclusions
of the preceding reasons, the media of those that follow, the things which
the arguments respect, must doubtless have a similar order as to being,
and their progeny must be the causes of things subject, and generative
of such as are secondary. But if this be admitted, how can we allow that
all of them have the same peculiarity and nature? For cause, and that which
is produced from cause, are separated from each other.
But this likewise will happen to those who assert that one nature is
to be explored in all the arguments, that they will by no means perceive
how in the three first conclusions. the one remains unseparated
from being, but is first separated in the fourth conclusion. But in all
the following conclusions, the one is explored considered as subsisting
itself by itself. Is it not therefore necessary, that these orders must
differ from each other? For that which is without separation, in consequence
of having an occult and undivided subsistence, is more allied to the
one, but that which is separated, has proceeded farther from the first
principle of things.
Again, if you are willing, to consider the multitude of the arguments,
and the extent of the hypothesis, how much it differs from that which follows
it, - neither from this will it appear to you to be entirely about one
and an unseparated nature. For reasonings about divine concerns, are contracted
in the more principal causes, because in these the occult is more abundant
than the perspicuous, and the ineffable than the known. But tbey become
multiplied and evolved, by proceeding to divine orders more proximate to
our nature. For such things as are more allied to that which is ineffable,
unknown, and exempt in inaccessible places, are allotted an hyparxis more
foreign from verbal communciation. But such things as have proceeded farther,
are both more known to us, and more apparent to the phantasy, than such
as have a prior subsistence.
This, therefore, being abundantly proved, it is necessary that the
second hypothesis, should unfold all the divine orders, and should proceed
on high, from the most simple and unical to the whole multitude and all
the number of divine natures, in which the order of true being ends, which
indeed is spread under the unities of the Gods, and at the same time is
divided in conjunction with their occult and ineffable peculiarities. If,
therefore, we are not deceived in admitting this, it follows that from
this hypothesis, the continuity of the divine order and the progression
of second from first natures, is to be assumed, together with the peculiarity
of all the divine genera. And indeed, that their communion is with each
other, and what their distinction proceeding according to measure, likewise,
the auxiliaries which may be found in other dialogues respecting the truth
of real beings, or the unities which they contain, are all to be referred
to this hypothesis. For, here we may contemplate the total progressions
of the Gods, and their all-perfect orders, according to theological science.
For as we have before shown that the whole treatise of the Parmenides has
reference to the truth of things, and that it was not devised as a vain
evolution of words, it is doubtless necessary, that the nine hypotheses
which it discusses, employing the dialectic method, but speculating with
divine science, should be about things and certain natures, which are either
middle or last. If, therefore, Parmenides acknowledges that his whole discourse
will be about the one, and how it subsists with respect to itself,
and all other things, it is evident that the speculation of the one,
must commence from that which is highest, but end in that which is the
last of all things. For the hyparxis of the one proceeds from on high,
as far as to the most obscure hypostasis of things.
Chapter XII
As the first hypothesis, however; demonstrates by negations the ineffable
supereminence of the first principle of things, and evinces that he is
exempt from all essence and knowledge, - it is evident that the hypothesis
after this as being proximate to it, must unfold the whole order of the
Gods. For Parmenides does not alone assume the intellectual and essential
peculiarity of the Gods, but likewise the divine characteristic of their
hyparxis through the whole of this hypothesis. For what other one
can that be which is participated by being, than that which is in every
being divine, and through which all things are conjoined with the imparticipable
one? For as bodies through their life are conjoined with soul, and
as souls through their intellective part, are extended to total
intellect, and the first intelligence, in like manner true beings through
the one which they contain are reduced to an exempt union, and subsist
in unproceeding union with this first cause.
But because this hypothesis commences from that which is one being,
or being characterized by the one, and establishes the summit
of intelligibles as the first after the one, but ends in an essence
which participates of time, and deduces divine souls to the extremities
of the divine orders, it is necessary that the third hypothesis should
demonstrate by various conclusions, the whole multitude of partial souls,
and the diversities which they contain. And thus far the separate and incorporeal
hypostasis proceeds.
After this follows that nature which is divisible about bodies, and
inseparable from matter, which the fourth hypothesis delivers supernally
suspended from the Gods. And the last hypothesis is the procession of matter,
whether considered as one, or as various, which the fifth hypothesis demonstrates
by negations, according to its dissimilar similitude to the first. But
sometimes, indeed, the negations are privations, and sometimes the exempt
causes of all the productions. And what is the most wonderful of all, the
highest negations are only enunciative, but some in a supereminent manner,
and others according to deficiency. But
each of the negations consequent to these is affirmative; the one paradigmatically,
but the other iconically, or after the manner of an image. But the middle
corresponds to the order of soul, for it is composed from affirmative and
negative conclusions. But it possesses negations coordinate to affirmations.
Nor is it alone multiplied, like material natures, nor does it possess
an adventitious one; but the one which it contains, though it is
still one, yet subsists in motion and multiplication, and in its progressions
is, as it were, absorbed by essence. And such are the hypotheses which
unfold all beings, both separable and inseparable, together with the causes
of wholes, as well exempt, as subsisting in things themselves, according
to the hyparxis of the one.
But there are four other hypotheses besides these, which by taking
away the one, evince that all things must be entirely subverted, both beings
and things in generation, and that no being can any longer have any subsistence;
and this, in order that he may demonstrate the one to be the cause
of being and preservation, that through it all things participate of the
nature of being, and that each has its hyparxis suspended from the one.
And in short, we syllogistically collect this through all beings, that
if the one is, all things subsist as far as to the last hypostasis,
and if it is not, no being has any subsistence. The one, therefore,
is both the hypostatic and preservative cause of all things; which Parmenides
also himself collects at the end of the dialog. With respect, however,
to the hypothesis of the Parmenides, its division, and the speculation
of its several parts, we have sufficiently treated in our commentaries
on that dialog; so that it would be superfluous to enter into a prolix
discussion of these particulars at present. But as from what has been said,
it appears whence we may assume the whole of theology and from what dialogs
we may collect into one the theology distributed according to parts, we
shall in the next place treat about the common dogmas of Plato, which are
adapted to sacred concerns, and which extend to all the divine orders,
and shall evince that each of these is defined by him according to the
most perfect science. For things common are prior to such as are peculiar,
and are more known according to nature.
Chapter XIII
In the first place, therefore, we shall assume the things which are
demonstrated in the Laws, and contemplate how they take the lead, with
respect to the truth about the Gods, and are the most ancient of all the
other mystic conceptions about a divine nature. Three things, therefore,
are asserted by Plato in these writngs; that there are Gods; that their
providence extends to all things; and that they administer all things according
to justice, and suffer no perversion from worse natures.
That these then obtain the first rank among all theological dogmas,
is perfectly evident. For what can be of a more leading nature, than the
hyparxis of the Gods, or than boniform providence, or immutable and undeviating
power? Through which they produce secondary natures uniformly, preserve
themselves in an undefiled manner, and convert them to themselves. But
the Gods indeed govern other things, but suffer nothing from subordinate
natures, nor are changed with the variety of the things to which their
providence extends. We shall learn, however, how these things are defined
according to nature, if we endeavor to embrace be a reasoning process the
scientific method of Plato about each of them; and prior to these, survey
by what irrefragable arguments he proves that there are Gods; and thus
afterwards consider such problems as are conjoined with this dogma.
Of all beings, therefore, it is necessary that some should move only,
but that others should be moved only, and that the natures situated between
these, should both move and be moved. And with respect to these last it
is necessary, either that they should move others being themselves moved
by others, or that they should be self-motive. These four hypostases likewise,
are necessarily placed in an orderly series, one after another; that which
is moved only and suffers, depending on other primary causes; that which
moves others, and is at the same time moved, being prior to this; that
which is self-motive, and which is beyond that which both moves and is
moved, beginning from itself, and through its own motion imparting the
representation of being moved, to other things; and that which is immovable,
preceding whatever participates either producing or passive motion. For
everything self-motive, in consequence of possessing its perfection in
a transition and interval of life, depends on another more ancient cause,
which always subsists according to sameness, and in a similar manner, and
whose life is not in time, but in eternity. For time is an image of eternity.
If, therefore, all things which are moved by themselves, are moved
according to time, but the eternal form of motion is above that which is
carried in time, the self-motive nature will be second in order, and not
the first of beings. But that which moves others, and is moved by others,
must necessarily be suspended from a self-motive nature: and not this alone,
but likewise every alter-motive fabrication, as the Athenian guest demonstrates.
For if all things, says he, should stand still, unless self-motive natures
had a subsistence among things, there would be no such thing as that which
is first moved. For that which is immoveable, is by so means naturally
adapted to be moved, nor will there then be that which is first moved;
but the alter-motive nature is indigent of another moving power. The self-motive
nature, therefore, alone, as beginning from its own energy, will move both
itself and others in a secondary manner. For a thing of this kind imparts
the power of being moved to alter-motive natures, in the same manner as
an immovable nature imparts a motive power to all beings. In the third
place, that which is moved only, must first of all be suspended from things
moved by another, but moving others. For it is necessary, both that other
things, and the series of things moved, which extends in an orderly manner
from on high to the last of things, should be filled with their proper
media.
All bodies, therefore, belong to those things which are naturally moved
only, and are passive. For they are productive of nothing,, on account
of possessing an hypostasis endued with interval, and participating of
magnitude and bulk; since everything productive and motive of others, naturally
produces and moves, by employing an incorporeal power.
But of incorporeal natures, some are divisible about bodies, but others
are exempt from such a division about the last of things. Those incorporeals,
therefore, which are divisible about the bulks of bodies, whether they
subsist in qualities, or in material forms, belong to the number of things
moved by another, but at the same time moving others. For these, because
they possess an incorporeal allotment, participate of a motive power; but
because they are divided about bodies, are deprived of the power of verging
to themselves, are divided together with their subjects, and are full of
sluggishness from these, they are indigent of a motive nature which is
not borne along in a foreign seat, but possesses a hypostasis in itself.
Where, therefore, shall we obtain that which moves itself? For things extended
into natures possessing bulk and interval, or which are divided in these,
and subsist inseparably about them, must necessarily either be moved only,
or be motive through others. But it is necessary, as we have before observed,
that a self-motive nature should be prior to these, which is perfectly
established in itself, and not in others, and which fixes its energy in
itself, and not in things different from itself. There is, therefore, another
certain nature exempt from bodies, both in the heavens and in these very
mutable elements, from which bodies primarily derive the power of being
moved. Hence, if it be requisite to discover what such an essence as this
is, (rightly following Socrates, and considering what the end of things
is,) which by being present to alter-motive natures, imparts to them a
representation of self-motion, to which of the above mentioned natures
shall we ascribe the power of things being moved from themselves? For all
inanimate natures are alone alter-motive, they are adapted to suffer, through
a certain power eternally moving and compelling. It remains, therefore,
that animated natures must possess this representation, and that they are
self-motive in a secondary degree, but that the soul which is in them,
primarily moves itself, and is moved by itself, and that through a power
derived from itself as it imparts life to bodies, so likewise it extends
to them from itself a representation of being moved by themselves.
If, therefore, the self-motive essence is more ancient than alter-motive
natures, but soul is primarily self-motive, from which the image of self-motion
is imparted to bodies, soul will be beyond bodies, and the motion of every
body, will be the progeny of soul, and the motion it contains. Hence it
is necessary that the whole heaven and all the bodies it contains possessing
various motions, and being moved with these different motions, according
to nature (for a circulation is natural to every body of this kind) should
have ruling souls, which are essentially more ancient than bodies, and
which are moved in themselves, and supernally illuminate these with the
power of being moved. It is necessary, therefore, that these souls which
dispose in an orderly manner the whole world and the parts it contains,
and who impart to everything corporeal which is of itself destitute of
life, the power of being moved, inspiring it, for this purpose, with the
cause of motion, should either move all things conformably to reason, or
after a contrary manner, of which it is not lawful to assert. But if indeed
this world and everything in it which is disposed in an orderly manner,
and is moved equally and perpetually according to nature, as is demonstrated,
partly in the mathematical disciplines, and partly in physical discussions,
is suspended from an irrational soul, which moving itself moves also other
things, neither the order of the periods, nor the motion which is bounded
by one reason, nor the position of bodies, nor any other of those things
which are generated according to nature, will have a stable cause, and
which is able to distribute everything in an orderly manner, and according
to an invariable sameness of subsistence. For everything irrational is
naturally adapted to be adorned by something different from itself, and
is indefinite and unadorned in its own nature. But to commit all heaven
to a thing of this kind, and a circulation revolving according to reason,
and with an invariable sameness, is by no means adapted, either to the
nature of things, or to our undisciplined conceptions. If however, an intellectual
soul, and which employs reason, governs all things, and if everything which
is moved with a perpetual motion, is governed by a soul of this kind, and
there is no one of the wholes in the universe destitute of soul (for no
body is honorable if deprived of such a power as this, as Theopbrastus
somewhere says) if this be the case, whether does it possess this intellectual,
perfect, and beneficent power, according to participation, or according
to essence? For if, according to essence, it is necessary that every soul
should be of this kind, since each according to its own nature is self-motive.
But if, according to participation, there will be another intellect subsisting
in energy, more ancient than soul, which essentially possesses intellection,
and by its very being pre-assumes in itself the uniform knowledge of wholes;
since it is also necessary that the soul which is essentialized according
to reason, should possess that which pertains to intellect through participation,
and that the intellectual nature should be twofold; the one subsisting
primarily in a divine intellect itself; but the other, which proceeds from
this, subsisting secondarily in soul. To which, you may add, if you please,
the presence or intellectual illumination in body. For whence is the whole
of this heaven either spherical or moved in a circle, and whence does it
revolve with a sameness of circulation according to one definite order?
For how could it always be allotted the same idea and power immutably according
to nature, if it did not participate of specific formation according to
intellect? For soul indeed, is the supplier of motion; but the cause of
a firm establishment, and that which reduces the unstable mutation of things
that are moved, into sameness, and also a life which is bounded by one
reason, and a circulation which subsists with invariable sameness, will
evidently be superior to soul.
Body therefore, and the whole of this sensible nature belong to things
which are alter-motive but soul is self-motive, binding in itself all corporeal
motions; and prior to this is intellect which is immovable. Let no one,
however, suppose that I assert this immobility of intellect to resemble
that which is sluggish, destitute of life, and without respiration, but
that it is the leading cause of all motion, and the fountain, if you are
willing so to denominate it, of all life, both of that which is converted
to itself, and of that which has its hypostasis in other things. Through
these causes also, the world is denominated by Timaeus, an animal endued
with soul and intellect; being called by him an animal according to its
own nature, and the life pervading to it from soul, and which is distributed
about it, but animated or endued with soul, according to the presence of
a divine soul in it, and endued with intellect, according to intellectual
domination. For the supply of life, the government of soul, and the participation
of intellect connect and contain the whole of heaven.
If, however, this intellect is essentially intellect, since Timaeus,
indicating that the essence of intellect is the same with its intellection,
denominates it divine; for he says, that soul receiving a divine intellect
led an upright and wise life; if, therefore, this be the case, it is necessary
that the whole world should be suspended from its divinity, and that motion
indeed should be present to this universe from soul, but that its perpetual
permanency and sameness of subsistence should be derived from intellect.
And that its one union, the conspiration in it and sympathy, and its all-perfect
measure should originate from that unity, from which intellect is uniform,
soul is one, every being is whole and perfect according to its own nature,
and everything secondary together with perfection in its own proper nature,
participates of another more excellent peculiarity, from an order which
is always established above it. For that which is corporeal being alter-motive,
derives from soul the representation of self-motive power, and is through
it an animal. But soul being self-motive participates of a life according
to intellect, and energizing according to time, possesses a never-ceasing
energy, and an ever-vigilant life from its proximity to intellect. And
intellect possessing its life in eternity, always subsisting essentially
in energy, and fixing all its stable intellection at once is intellect,
is entirely deific through the cause prior to itself. For it has two-fold
energies as Plotinus says, some as intellect, but others as being inebriated
with nectar. And elsewhere be observes, that this intellect, is that which
is prior to itself and is not intellect, is a god; in the same manner as
soul, by its summit which is above soul, is intellect; and as body, by
the power which is prior to body, is soul.
All things therefore, as we have said, are suspended from the one
through intellect and soul as media. And intellect indeed has the form
of unity; but soul has the form of intellect; and the body of the world
is vital. But everything is conjoined with that which is prior to itself.
And of the natures posterior to these, one in a more proximate, but the
other in a more remote degree, enjoys that which is divine. And divinity,
indeed, is prior to intellect, being primarily carried in an intellectual
nature; but intellect is most divine, as being deified prior to other things;
and soul is divine, so far as it requires an intellectual medium. But the
body which participates of a soul of this kind, so far as body indeed,
is also itself divine; for the illumination of divine light pervades supernally
as far as to the last dependencies; yet it is not simply divine; but soul,
by looking to intellect, and living from itself, is primarily divine.
My reasoning is also the same about each of the whole spheres, and
about the bodies they contain. For all these imitate the whole heaven,
since these likewise have a perpetual allotment; and with respect to the
sublunary elements, they have not entirely an essential mutation, but they
abide in the universe according to their wholeness, and contain in themselves
partial animals. For every wholeness has posterior to itself more partial
essences. As, therefore, in the heavens, the number of the stars proceeds
together with the whole spheres, and as in the earth the multitude of partial
terrestrial animals subsists together with their wholeness, thus also it
appears to one to be necessary that in the wholes which have an intermediate
subsistence, each element should be filled up with appropriate numbers.
For how in the extremes can wholes which subsist prior to parts, be arranged
together with parts, unless there is the same analogy of them in the intermediate
natures?
But if each of the spheres is an animal, and is always established
after the same manner, and gives completion to the universe, as possessing
life indeed, it will always primarily participate of soul, but as preserving
its own order immutable in the world, it will be comprehended by intellect,
and as one and a whole, and the leader and ruler of its proper parts, it
will be illuminated by divine union. Not only the universe, therefore,
but each also of its perpetual parts is animated and endued with intellect,
and as much as possible is similar to the universe. For each of these parts
is a universe with respect to its kindred multitude. In short, there is
indeed one corporeal-formed wholeness of the universe, but there are many
others under this, depending on this one; there is one soul of the universe,
and after this, other souls, together with this disposing in an orderly
manner the whole parts of the universe with undefiled purity; one intellect,
and an intellectual number under this, participated by these souls; and
one god who connectedly contains at once all mundane and supermundane natures,
and a multitude of other gods, who distribute intellectual essences, and
the souls suspended from these, and all the parts of the world. For it
is not to be supposed that each of the productions of nature is generative
of things similar to itself, but that wholes and the first of mundane beings
should not in a much greater degree extend in themselves the paradigm of
a generation of this kind. For the similar is more allied, and more naturally
adapted to the reason of cause than the dissimilar, in the same manner
as the same than the different, and bound than the infinite. These things,
however, we shall accurately survey in what follows. But we shall now direct
our attention to the second of the things demonstrated in the Laws, viz.
that the Gods providentially attend at once to wholes and parts, and shall
summarily discuss the irreprehensible conception of Plato about the providence
of the Gods.
Chapter XIV
From what has been said, therefore, it is evident to everyone, that
the Gods being the causes of all motion, some of them are essential and
vivific, according to a self-motive, self-vital, and self-energetic power.
But others of them are intellectual, and excite by their very being all
secondary' natures to the perfection of life, according to the fountain
and principle of all second and third progressions of motion. And others
are unical, or characterized by unity, deifying by participation all the
whole genera of themselves, according to a primary, all-perfect, and unknown
power of energy, and who are the leaders of one kind of motion, but are
not the principle of another. But again others supply to secondary natures
motion according to place or quality, but are essentially the causes of
motion to themselves. For everything which is the cause of essence to other
things is much prior to this the cause of itself, of its own proper energies
and perfection. Farther still, that which is self-motive is again the principle
of motion, and being and life are imparted by soul to everything in the
world, and not local motion only and the other kinds of motion, but the
progression into being is from soul, and by a much greater priority from
an intellectual essence, which binds to itself the life of self-motive
natures and precedes according to cause all temporal energy. And in a still
greater degree do motion, being, and life proceed from a unical hyparxis,
which connectedly contains intellect and soul, is the source of total good,
and proceeds as far as to the last of things. For of life indeed, not all
the parts of the world are capable of participating, nor of intellect and
a gnostic power; but of the one all things participate, as far as
to matter itself, both wholes and parts, things which subsist according
to nature, and the contraries to these; and there is not anything which
is deprived of a cause of this kind, nor can anything ever participate
of being, if it is deprived of the one. If, therefore, the Gods
produce all things, and contain all things, in the unknown comprehension
of themselves, how is it possible there should not be a providence of all
things in these comprehensions, pervading supernally as far as to the most
partial natures? For it is everywhere fit that offspring should enjoy the
providential care of their causes. But all alter-motive are the progeny
or self-motive natures. And things which subsist in time, either in the
whole of time, or in a part of it, are the effects of eternal natures;
because that which always is, is the cause of that which sometimes exists.
And divine and unical genera, as they give subsistence to all multiplied
natures, precede them in existence. In short, there is no essence, or multitude
of powers, which is not allowed its generation from the one. It
is necessary, therefore, that all these should be partakers of the providence
of preceding causes, being vivified indeed from the psychical gods, and
circulating according to temporal periods; and participating of sameness
and at the same time a stable condition of forms from the intellectual
gods; but receiving into themselves the presence of union, of measure,
and of the distribution of the good from the first Gods. It is necessary,
therefore, either that the Gods should know that a providential care of
their own offspring is natural to them, and should not only give subsistence
to secondary beings, and supply them with life, essence and union, but
also previously comprehend it themselves the primary cause of the goods
they contain, or, which it is not lawful to assert, that being Gods, they
are ignorant of what is proper and fit.
For what ignorance can there be of beautiful things, with those who
are the causes of beauty, or of things good, with those who are allotted
an hyparxis defined by the nature of the good? But if they are ignorant,
neither do souls govern the universe according to intellect, nor are intellects
carried in souls as in a vehicle, nor prior to these do the unities of
the Gods contractedly comprehend in themselves all knowledge, which we
have acknowledged they do through the former demonstrations. If, therefore,
they are not deprived of knowledge, being the fathers, leaders and governors
of everything in the world, and to them as being such a providential cure
of the things governed by, and following them, and generated by them, pertains,
whether shall we say that they knowing the law which is according to nature,
accomplish this law, or that through imbecility they are deprived of a
providential attention to their possessions or progeny, for it is of no
consequence as to the present discussion which of these two appellations
you are willing to adopt? For if through want of power they neglect the
superintendence of wholes, what is the cause of this want of power? For
they do not move things externally, nor are other things indeed the causes
of essence, but they assume the government of the things they have produced,
but they rule over all things as if from the stern of a ship, themselves
supplying being, themselves containing the measures of life, and themselves
distributing to things their respective energies.
Whether also, are they unable to provide at once for all things, or
they do not leave each of the parts destitute of their providential care?
And if they are not curators of everything in the world, whether do they
providentially superintend greater things, but neglect such as are less?
Or do they pay attention to the less, but neglect to take care of the greater?
For if we deprive them of a providential attention to all things similarly,
through the want of power, how, while we attribute to them a greater thing,
viz. the production of all things, can we refuse to grant that which
is naturally consequent to this, a providential attention to their productions?
For it is the province of the power which produces a greater thing, to
dispose in a becoming manner that which is less. But if they are curators
of less things, and neglect such as are greater, how can this mode of providence
be right? For that which is more allied, and more similar to anything,
is more appropriately and fitly disposed by nature to the participation
of the good which that thing confers on it. If, however, the Gods think
that the first of mundane natures deserve their providential care, and
that perfection of which they are the sources, but are unable to extend
their regard to the last of things what is it that can restrain the presence
of the Gods from pervading to all things? What is it which can impede their
unenvying and exuberant energy? How can those who are capable of effecting
greater things, be unable to govern such as are less? Or how can those
who produce the essence even of the smallest things, not be the lords of
the perfection of them, through a privation of power? For all these things
are hostile to our natural conceptions. It remains therefore that the Gods
must know what is fit and appropriate, and they must possess a power adapted
to the perfection of their own nature, and to the government of the whole
of things. But if they know that which is according to nature, and this
to those who are the generating causes of all things is to take care of
all things, and an exuberance of power, - if this be the case, they are
not deprived of a providential attention of this kind. Whether, also, together
with what has been said, is there a will of providence in them? Or is this
alone wanting both to their knowledge and power? And on this account are
things deprived of their providential care? For if indeed knowing what
is fit for themselves, and being able to accomplish what they know, they
are unwilling to provide for their own offspring, they will be indigent
of goodness, their unenvying exuberance will perish, and we shall do nothing
else than abolish the hyparxis according to which they are essentialized.
For the very being of the Gods is defined by the good, and in this they
have their subsistence. But to provide for things of a subject nature,
is to confer on them a certain good. How, therefore, can we deprive the
Gods of providence, without at the same time depriving them of goodness?
And how if we subvert their goodness is it possible, that we should not
also ignorantly subvert their hyparxis which we established by the former
demonstrations? Hence it is necessary to admit as a thing consequent to
the very being of the Gods that they are good according to every virtue.
And again, it is consequent to this that they do not withdraw themselves
from a providential attention to secondary natures, either through indolence,
or imbecility, or ignorance. But to this I think it is also consequent
that there is with them the most excellent knowledge, unpolluted power,
and unenvying and exuberant will. From which it appears that they provide
for the whole of things, and omit nothing which is requisite to the supply
of good.
Let, however, no one think that the Gods extend such a providence about
secondary things, as is either of a busy or laborious nature, or that this
is the case with their exempt transcendency, which is established remote
from mortal difficulty. For their blessedness is not willing to be defiled
with the difficulty of administration, since even the life of good men
is accompanied with facility, and is void of molestation and pain. But
all labors and molestation arise from the impediments of matter. If, however,
it be requisite to define the mode of the providence of the Gods, it must
be admitted that it is spontaneous, unpolluted, immaterial, and ineffable.
For the Gods do not govern all things either by investigating what is fit,
or exploring the good of everything by ambiguous reasonings or by looking
externally, and following their effects as men do in the providence which
tbey exert on their own affairs; but pre-assuming in themselves the measures
of the whole of things, and producing the essence of everything from themselves,
and also looking to themselves, they lead and perfect all things in a silent
path, by their very being, and fill them with good. Neither, likewise,
do they produce in a manner similar to nature, energizing only by their
very being, unaccompanied with deliberate choice, nor energizing in a manner
similar to partial souls in conjunction with will, are they deprived of
production according to essence; but they contract both these into one
union, and they will indeed such things as they are able to effect by their
very being, but by their very essence being capable of and producing all
things, they contain the cause of production in their unenvying and exuberant
will. By what busy energy, therefore, with what difficulty, or with the
punishment of what Ixion, is the providence either of whole souls, or of
intellectual essences, or of the Gods themselves accomplished, unless it
should be said, that to impart good in any respect is laborious to the
Gods? But that which is according to nature is not laborious to anything.
For neither is it laborious to fire to impart heat, nor to snow to refrigerate,
nor in short to bodies to energize according to their own proper powers.
And prior to bodies, neither is it laborious to natures to nourish, or
generate, or increase. For these are the works of natures. Nor again, prior
to these, is it laborious to souls. For these indeed produce many energies
from deliberate choice, many from their very being, and are the causes
of many motions by alone being present. So that if indeed the communication
of good is according to nature to the Gods, providence also is according
to nature. And these things we must say are accomplished by the Gods with
facility, and by their very being alone. But if these things are not according
to nature, neither will the Gods be naturally good. For the good is the
supplier of good; just as life is the source of another life, and intellect
is the source of intellectual illumination. And everything which has a
primary subsistence in each nature is generative of that which has a secondary
subsistence.
That however, which is especially the illustrious prerogative of the
Platonic theology, I should say is this, that according to it, neither
is the exempt essence of the Gods converted to secondary natures, through
a providential care for things subordinate, nor is their providential presence
with all things diminished through their transcending the whole of things
with undefiled purity, but at the same time it assigns to them a separate
subsistence, and the being unmingled with every subordinate nature, and
also the being extended to all things, and the taking care of and adorning
their own progeny. For the manner in which they pervade through all things
is not corporeal, as that of light is through the air, nor is it divisible
about bodies, in the same manner as in nature, nor converted to subordinate
natures, in the same manner as that of a partial soul, but it is separate
from body, and without conversion to it, is immaterial, unmingled, unrestrained,
uniform, primary and exempt. In short, such a mode of the providence of
the Gods as this, must at present be conceived. For it is evident that
it will be appropriate according to each order of the Gods. For soul indeed,
is said to provide for secondary natures in one way, and intellect in another.
But the providence of divinity that is prior to intellect is exerted according
to a transcendency both of intellect and soul. And of the Gods themselves,
the providence of the sublunary is different from that of the celestial
divinities. Of the Gods also who are beyond the world, there are many orders,
and the mode of providence is different according to each.
Chapter XV
The third problem after these we shall connect with the former, and
survey how we are to assume the unpervertible in the Gods, who perform
all things according to justice, and who do not in the smallest degree
subvert its boundary, or its undeviating rectitude, in their providential
attention to all other things, and in the mutations of human affairs. I
think therefore, that this is apparent to everyone, that everywhere that
which governs according to nature, and pays all possible attention to the
felicity of the governed, after this manner becomes the leader of that
which it governs, and directs it to that which is best. For neither has
the pilot who rules over the sailors and the ship any other precedaneous
end than the safety of those that sail in the ship, and of the ship itself,
nor does the physician who is the curator of the diseased, endeavor to
do all things for the sake of anything else than the health of the subjects
of his care, whether it be requisite to cut them, or administer to them
a purgative medicine. Nor would the general of an army or a guardian say
that they look to any other end, than the one to the liberty of those that
are guarded, and the other to the liberty of the soldiers. Nor will any
other to whom it belongs to be the leader or curator of certain persons,
endeavor to subvert the good of those that follow him, which it is his
business lo procure, and with a view to which he disposes in a becoming
manner everything belonging to those whom he governs. If therefore we grant
that the Gods are the leaders of the whole of things, and that their providence
extends to all things, since they are good, and possess every virtue, how
is it possible they should neglect the felicity of the objects of their
providential care? Or how can they be inferior to other leaders in the
providence of subordinate natures? Since the Gods indeed always look to
that which is better, and establish this as the end of all their government,
but other leaders overlook the good of men, and embrace vice rather than
virtue, in consequence of being perverted by the gifts of the depraved.
And universally, whether you are willing to call the Gods leaders,
or rulers, or guardians, or fathers, a divine nature will appear to be
in want of no one of such names. For all things that are venerable and
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