Information Technology:
US/Russian Perspectives and Potential
forMilitary-Political Cooperation

Advanced information technology (IT)¹systems and weaponry have caused significant changes in the internationalsecurity environment. The changes are monumental, and not all are positive.Non-state sponsored groups with access to advanced IT can present dangers nearlyon a par with nations. A threat could originate from a drug cartel, warlord, ormafia group's attack on an IT such as a nuclear power plant, or from the chaosgenerated by a computer virus inserted into a country's defense (air defense,nuclear, and so forth) computer system prompted by a variety of agendas.

At the same time, situational awareness in nations with access to hightechnology is more complete than ever before. The ability to monitorconversations and movements is extraordinary and affects the character, speedand precision of diplomatic and military responses against all types of threats.Realizing the impact of rapid new developments in information technology on theemerging twenty-first century security environment, security officials in boththe United States and Russia are trying to monitor and coordinate defenses andactive measures. In the end, this will require closer coordination between theUnited States and Russia to ensure that one side does not misinterpret an eventand send the world to the brink of an information war (IW).²

Following reconsideration of military priorities and national securityinterests as a result of rapid technological advances, both the United Statesand Russia elevated the protection of information assets to a strategic level.They also recognized the compelling need to master the speed of change in IT andto monitor its spread to rogue nations. IT change is reflected in restructureddefense budgets, infrastructure reorganizations, and the security policies ofthese nations. Policy must address not only high technology threats from othernations but also the ability of terrorists to affect national interests asnational armies once did. Further, IT has upset traditional militaryconsiderations such as the employment of military art.

This chapter will discuss three IT related topics: Russian and US views ofthe impact of IT on military-political considerations; how both countries aremanaging IT concerns, to include civilian restructuring; and opportunities andchallenges for US and Russian cooperation in IT. The discussion is important inthat IT offers a threat similar to what Herman Kahn termed "spasm war" in OnEscalation, an irrational, spasmodic response to an attack (whether nuclearor IT) on a power's C3I (command, control, communication and intelligence)before or during crisis.³

THE IMPACT OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ON MILITARYCONSIDERATIONS

Russian Views

For Russia, the initial concern regarding IT was its impact on society, andon the strategy and tactics of the armed forces. Over the past three years,Russia has actively pursued a methodology for the use of IT as well to ensuremilitary-political stability. The conditions (to a Russian, contradictions) thatIT methodologies must address are the same as in the past: social, political,economic, territorial, religious, nationalist, and ethnic, among others.Security analysts recognize, however, that the form or manifestation of theseconditions has changed, as each now relies heavily on IT. Thus, as Russiadevelops policy to protect its national interests, preserve its territorialintegrity, maintain its national sovereignty, and protect its population,information security and IT sit at or near the top of its priorities. Realmilitary power, for example, will not only be determined by the quantity offorces but by the qualitative parameters of the force, allowing for theimplementation of IT to achieve interoperability in planning; to integratetechnical systems that support command and control and logistics functions; andto successfully utilize indirect actions (economic sanctions, communicationsblockades, demonstrations of force, use of peacekeeping forces, and so forth) tosupplement direct deployments and strategies.

The impact of IT (from a Russian viewpoint) on military-politicalconsiderations affecting national security takes many forms. First, informationresources require effective state policies that monitor information security,especially since the use of IT may not involve physical damage or loss of life,making it more acceptable (no ecological fallout) than nuclear weapons.⁴Attempts to disrupt information exchanges or flows, the illegal use andcollection of information, unsanctioned access to information resources, themanipulation of information, the illegal copying of data from informationsystems, or the unauthorized theft of information from data bases and banks areall threats that can disrupt economic or military relations between nations andrequire a serious response.⁵

Second, parity in nuclear forces now can only be achieved through parity inIT. Information warfare systems (including intelligence and informationcollection) have upset norms of parity based primarily on numbers andquality.⁶Intelligence, command and control, early warning, communications, electronicwarfare, "special software engineering effects," and disinformation are issuesthat upset the traditional correlation of forces, and appear as a hidden form ofmiltary- political pressure.⁷Superiority in IT, for example, could debilitate a nuclear coding or launchcommand procedure, making them unreliable or useless.

Third, Russia cannot allow a PSYWAR-IT (psychological warfareinformationtechnology) campaign to destroy the Russian economy. According to some Russiananalysts, the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was an attempt toeconomically exhaust the Soviet Union by causing it to spend money it did nothave on systems it could not use. Some Russian analysts view current UnitedStates interest in "information warfare" as another such attempt.⁸Russian analysts advise not to enter an arms race such as IW that is planned byother countries, but to devise military -technical priorities that are suited tothe economic opportunities and strategic goals of the country. An IT strikeagainst the Russian market is another threat in this category.

Fourth, Russia cannot allow IT and information operations to debilitate thenation's psychological stability, or to cause leaders to make incorrectjudgments and decisions. Information currently presents a threat to society, theindividual, and state institutions in Russia since the population is in atransition period and many citizens are psychologically vulnerable (that is,without a firm ideological basis). Control of the mass media is onemanifestation of this threat.⁹The Internet is also a concern to some Russian officials, since it potentiallycan be used to commit crimes or unite political parties and groups against thegovernment. Finally, if a country's decision-making cycle is damaged throughcomputer network penetration and insertion of disinformation, governments oragencies may reach incorrect conclusions and decisions.¹⁰This is particularly dangerous in crisis situations when nations are workingunder extreme time constraints.

Fifth, and perhaps most important, IT's use in information operations blursthe Russian concept of the initial period of war. Since information attacks maybe silent and capable of hiding their source or origin, planning for orresponding to an initial period of war becomes treacherously complicated. Whatconstitutes and differentiates the start of a crisis period, period of imminentwar, and an offensive information operation, and how would one determine when orhow an operation started? How does one determine with accuracy who delivered theattack? Should one respond with information actions against all probable enemiesor only the most likely? How long can one delay a response before the entireinformation infrastructure of a country is under attack and a response is nolonger possible?

Sixth, IT greatly enhances the military effectiveness of weapons systems andexploits point targets. Qualitative and quantitative indicators of weaponeffectiveness have been replaced by the amount of informatization(digitalization, miniaturization, computer coding, and so forth) that a weaponcontains, allowing huge amounts of information to be processed. IT raises thecombat potential of precision weapons, and affects correlation of forcescalculations since the ability exists, theoretically, to hit strategic pointtargets (nuclear weapons, command and control nodes, centers of political andeconomic significance) anywhere via cruise missiles. Computer viruses areanother concern generated by IT. Many viruses and counter virus agents have beendeveloped,¹¹including a stealth virus.¹²By the year 2000, Russian scientists also expect to confront distance virusweapons, computer viruses introduced through radio channels or laser lines ofcommunications directly into computers of strategic significance.¹³

Finally, IT has had a significant impact on military art. The spaceair-groundcharacter of contemporary war includes satellites that process information andoffer navigation assistance, and airborne sensors that detect movement andcoordinate fires on ground targets. The center of gravity for militaryconfrontations has changed from land and sea theaters of military action to theair-space theater. Warfare has a real-time aspect, requiring forces toacquire/engage/move. Formerly cyclical military operations (periods of intenseconflict followed by periods of standown) will be replaced by operations thatare less cyclical and more linear. Winners will acquire/shoot/move faster thantheir opponents for longer periods of time. IT also assists in overcominguncertainty in war, producing streams of information allowing for accuratesituational awareness, limiting surprise in the traditional sense, and offeringIT landlords the perspective of a chess player peering five or six moves intothe future. Most significantly, Russian theorists realize that military art mustbe designed not only for opponents who are equal in the use of informationtechnology, but also for those adversaries who are superior or inferior tofriendly forces in this respect.¹⁴IT and the infosphere, defined as a body of general and specialized programs forcreating, processing, and storing computerized data, will be likely targets ifwar occurs.

US Views

For the United States, initial concern centered on how to employ or use IT,since America was dealt a superior IT hand from the beginning. Only later didthe impact of IT on society and the nation's infrastructure become an issue. Forexample, the 1997 United States National Military Strategy refers toinformation warfare as an asymmetric challenge that could circumvent USstrengths, exploit US vulnerabilities, or confront the nation in ways that couldnot be matched in kind.¹⁵This also prompted the creation of a presidential commission to study theproblem. The response of the US military to this challenge was a conceptualwarfighting template entitled Joint Vision 2010, which rested oninformation superiority and technological innovation, and strived to implementnew operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focusedlogistics, and full-dimensional protection.¹⁶

The impact of IT (from a US viewpoint) on military-political considerationsaffecting national security are, first, that the security link between thecommercial and military sectors has grown much closer. In order to enable ITstrategies, the military had to link itself closely with civilian technology.The military-technical revolution and revolution in military affairs (RMA)actually started in the civilian sector, led by computer chip and optical fibertechnology. Military applications soon followed. It became apparent, however,that since the military sector continued to rely heavily on commercialtechnologies and enterprises (such as phone systems), it was as prone tocriminal attack as the commercial systems. This has forced both sectors to sharemore ideas on joint commissions, and to develop joint visions for informationsecurity systems to protect IT.

Second, an extended reliance on IT may invoke an asymmetric attack from aweak IT opponent. America was confronted by this eventuality during the GulfWar. Saddam Hussein, unable to counter the coalition's high-tech force, resortedto SCUD, chemical, and ecological terror as counters. A better equipped andprepared force than Iraq could inflict serious damage on an IT force, as theGulf War demonstrated. IT weaponry is a technique but not an end-all. OneRussian has warned that an information attack against it will result in anuclear strike against the source of the attack and the country that authorizedthe attack.¹⁷

Third, IT can contribute to maintaining an overseas presence with fewerforces. IT can provide a virtual presence almost anywhere in the world andmonitor early indications and warnings of potential conflict areas or of treatyor international law violations. Overseas presence is provided by IT-equippedUAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) and satellite surveillance. IT in a virtualpresence role is supported by the worldwide presence of the US Navy, whose ITability to affect ground operations has improved significantly, especiallythrough the increased role of sensors and ships armed with cruise missiles. ITalso supports the thinking of General Dennis Reimer, Chief of Staff of the USArmy, who believes in strategic pre-emption, the ability to halt or prevent aconflict or crisis before it becomes debilitating or protracted - before itspreads out of control.¹⁸Pre-emption can contribute to shaping the environment diplomatically andeconomically, and can compel compliance with specific IT measures. The USlearned prior to its intervention in Bosnia that modeling conflicts withsuperior computer graphics and virtual reality helped to compel compliance amongthe parties at the Dayton Accord negotiations. A three-dimensional computermodel of Bosnia's terrain was developed and used by negotiators to show thepresidents where the zone of separation must be located, and where theirboundaries would be, with mapping provided by using real-time satellite imagesfrom flyovers of Bosnia.¹⁹

Fourth, IT allows for communications directly from the Pentagon to thefoxhole, blurring the distinction between levels of action and complicatingcommand issues. IT has produced communications achievements that are staggering.Senior officials in the Pentagon can now literally sit in on operationsconducted by their forces or by others.

Fifth, IT is assisting in the discovery of new non-lethal weapons based onphysical principles. The US military is working on the development of acoustic,vortex and microwave weapons.²⁰Computers and recent advancements in miniaturized electronics, power generation,and beam aiming may finally have put pulse, electromagnetic radiation, and beamweapons on the cusp of practicality, according to some experts.

Sixth, IT has brought changes in several issues of military art. According toone analyst, some of the most significant are 1) an increase in the tempo ofoperations, which limits time for planning and decision making, requiringorganizational, doctrinal, force structure, and technological changes, andadaptations to both regular and irregular operations to compel or enforce normsof behavior; 2) the extended use of robotic reconnaissance mechanisms (such asUAVs, Joint Surveillance, Targeting and Radar Systems - JSTARS) and precisionmunitions, which allow tanks and artillery to discard range and other targetingessentials (terrain, multiple shots for bracketing, and so forth) and makesbattlefield awareness and management easier; 3) increased rates of movement withprecision, allowing units to outpace an adversary's ability to react; 4) use ofsensors on vehicles, which allows reporting to be instantaneous, and providessituational updates at the flick of a switch at higher headquarters; and 5) theability of small units to employ the former combat power of a division,affecting the balance between combat power and manpower, the nature of commandand control, and distinctions of strategic and tactical levels of war.²¹

Another analyst has noted that complexity, a spontaneous consequence ofimposing regulation and control on a chaotic state, is the definingcharacteristic of modem military organizations and operations, and is controlledby the cohesion and integrating ability of information. Military art is affectedin that the military uses information to describe itself and an adversary, toorganize itself, to offer visual or situational awareness through extracting,processing, and distribution of data, to execute a mosaic of deep and protractedoperations (operational art), and to offer the grammar, language, syntax, andlogic of complex systems, making them not only understandable but showing theirevolutionary qualities. Armies are complex systems that flow in a sea ofinformation, and only the use of cybershock can stop the flow via operationssecurity, deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare,reconnaissance and counter reconnaissance, and tempo and surprise.²²IT can also be useful to train the force via computer simulations and virtualreality scenarios. Also, IT can be used in training the force en route to acrisis by offering computer-generated problems in accordance with the situationon the ground.

Seventh, centers of gravity in warfare have changed. Past strategies involvedthe concentration of one's forces at a particular time and place to win adecisive battle. Information centers of gravity focus on weaknesses ininformation infrastructures and equipment. IT's disabling capabilities prohibitforces from massing, planes from finding targets in a quick and accurate manner,strategies from developing, and decisive points from being located, calculatedand attacked. These operations could occur in peacetime as well as wartime,according to some. The main point to recognize is that the greatest challengefor the policy maker will be to manage a national intelligence architecture,which can rapidly identify the information center of gravity, prepare theinformation battlefield, and deliver the appropriate (non-lethal) informationmunitions to carry the day.²³

Finally, IT can affect the weakest link on the battlefield: the individualsoldier's mind. The mind is not protected by a firewall as is the computer, andthe ultimate operator of equipment, the soldier/leader, is offered littleprotection in the IT environment. There are two forms of protection required:one from physical attacks (electromagnetic pulses, acoustic weapons, voicesynthesis, and so forth) and one from attacks on the perception capabilities ofthe mind. This is especially true due to the quick pace of development in theproduction of holograms. These can be used to make an army look larger than itis, or to make life-sized tank and soldier holograms appear to move and therebyconfuse or intimidate soldiers. Hologram technology "uses a laser to illuminatean object and write its image into a photo-refractive crystal, while anotherlaser projects that image into a liquid scattering material."²⁴Holograms are also being considered for their value in propaganda productions,such as morphing images of political leaders. Soldiers require training torecognize misleading information produced from holograms, voice synthesis orother psychological tricks.

Other reports indicate that the computer-operator interface will be a crucialarea requiring attention. Progress in neuro-muscular control, mind control andconnectivity developments suggest additional areas of focus. The point tounderscore is that the mind is vulnerable and, therefore, it is necessary todevote greater attention to the potential use of non-lethal or otherinformation-based technologies.

MANAGING INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

Russia's Responses

In September 1997, Russia's Security Council discussed the draft version ofthe country's information security policy. It consisted of five parts: generalprinciples (legal basis and role of information in society); threats to theRussian Federation's information security (to the country's informationinfrastructure and information resources, especially technical andconstitutional ones); methods of ensuring Russia's information security (legal,organizational, economic); government policy foundations for ensuringinformation security (openness, ownership, legal equality); and theorganizational structure and principles for designing the system (an aggregateof federal government agencies and organizations to coordinate activities) toensure the country's information security (strategy, evaluations, coordination,certification, licensing, and implementing a unified technical policy). Thispolicy is the strongest element of Russia's response to its concerns over theuse of IT by foreign countries.²⁵

To combat information threats to Russia, primary responsibility lies in thehands of the Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information(FAPSI). This agency combats hackers, foreign special services, and domesticcriminals who aim to gain unsanctioned access to information and to disableelectronic management.²⁶FAPSI's deputy director, Colonel-General Vladimir Markomenko, is the onlyofficial voice to define Russian IW to date.²⁷His definition suggests that IW is the use of IT against the state in the formof special electronic and communication devices, hardware and software attacks,and other technical means.

The Russian armed forces are working on combining IT with older psychologicalconcepts such as reflexive control (a means or method used to convey speciallyprepared information to a person, organization or country to influence theadoption of a predetermined decision desired by the initiator of the action).Some Russian analysts believe that a combination of information warfare andreflexive control offers a greater danger than the direct use of militarypower:

The most dangerous manifestation of the tendency to rely onmilitary power relates not so much to the direct use of the means of armedcombat as to the possible results of the use of reflexive control by theopposing side via developments in the theory and practice of informationwar.²⁸

The Russian military is proceeding to develop IT even in the current militaryand economic crisis. Some of the effort involves skipping over severalgenerations of weapons. Russian military officers write about using IT todevelop virtual realities and synthetic environments in military affairs.Virtual reality to one Russian officer is a complex set of artificial images ofan environment (situations) that take place in a real time or close to real timescale, replicating processes that are created in the human mind by software andhardware means.²⁹Current uses for virtual reality training include creating systems to synthesizeroutine, crisis and battle situations at various levels; creating means togenerate models (for preparing information for decision-makers) to help forecastpolitical and military -political situations in regions and different countries;developing forms and methods of conducting the armed struggle; creating systemsto train officers individually or in groups; and creating means of psychologicalinfluence for individuals and the mass consciousness of people.³⁰It is believed that from the use of virtual reality systems, one will look at abattlefield from a bird's eye view and from the enemy side, providing anopportunity for preparing and running operations repeatedly in selected ways.Also, one can test weapon systems through virtual reality means before acquiringthem. Virtual reality will also be used by the military leadership to improvedoctrine and test personnel and equipment loss-free under varying climaticconditions, times of day, and levels of readiness.³¹

Russia's computer research and development process, which continues unabated,has produced some unexpected results unique to the Russian experience. Oneresult is the neuron computer which, according to one expert, is expected toreplace the pentium chip for speed and effectiveness in Russia. They arereportedly 1000 times faster than traditional computers. Military uses includethe development of state-of-the-art high precision weapons, optic devices todetect missiles, and use in anti-ballistic missile (ABM) programs and dualtechnologies. In financial markets, the computers could make highly accurateforecasts (reported 90 per cent accuracy) of currency and futures rates, stocksand other securities.³²

In other fields, the government's science and technology committee approvedthe following information-related fields as priority directions in the area ofcritical federal-level technologies:

• multi processor parallel-structure computers
• computer systems based on neuronet computers, transputers, and opticalcomputers
• speech, text, and image recognition and synthesis systems
• artificial intelligence and virtual reality systems
• information and telecommunication systems
• mathematical modeling systems
• microsystem technology and mircosensors
• superlarge integrated circuits and nanoelectronics
• optical and acoustic electronics
• cryoelectronics production technologies
• laser technologies
• precision and mechatronic technologies
• robotic systems and micromachines
• electronic-ion-plasma technologies
• intellectual systems for automated design and control³³

US Responses

President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 39 (late 1995) andExecutive Order 13010 (15 July 1996) to establish a President's Commission onCritical Infrastructure Protection. The commission was to develop a nationalpolicy and implementation strategy to protect critical infrastructures fromcyber or physical threats. The commission received the report of the DefenseScience Board for its consideration as well. By November 1997, the commissionhad written its report, distributed it, and disbanded. How the President willuse the report remains to be seen. Critical infrastructures identified were:telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil storage andtransportation, banking and finance, transportation, water supply systems,emergency services, and continuity of government services.

High technology responsibility for protecting critical infrastructures andcombating information threats to US society lies with the US National SecurityAgency (NSA), especially the relay of indications and warnings information tocommand authorities. NSA warns decisionmakers of potential threats. Thisresponsibility differs from the period of the Cold War when one departmentfocused signals intelligence (SIGINT) specifically on the former Soviet Union,and another focused on Asia. These missions are gone, and the new missions ofthese two departments are to combat criminals involved 1) in transnationalissues, irrespective of geography, and 2) in attacks on the commercial sector'sinformation resources. A new threat matrix uses IT as one of its principalcombatants and operators. NSA is also responsible for identifying and combatingthreats to and vulnerabilities of technologies and infrastructures (such astelecommunications). The focus for NSA has slipped to the infrastructure of anadversarial force's operating capability instead of planes, tanks, and ships.Regarding the protection of commercial projects, NSA is to provide technicalexpertise on encryption standards for commercial firms and on systems forrecovering data in secure environments.³⁴Many of NSA's responsibilities correspond with those of FAPSI, noted above, toinclude the close relationship with IW. In 1996, John Deutsch, then director ofthe Central Intelligence Agency, announced his intention to create a cyberwarfare center at NSA.

The US armed forces' major contribution to its information security was areport issued in 1996 by the Defense Science Task Board entitled the DefenseScience Board Task Force on Information Warfare (IW-D). The board made 13recommendations to the Chairman of the Defense Science Board.³⁵The board members did not prioritize the key recommendations, deciding that allshould be implemented immediately. The board recommended establishing a centerto provide strategic indications and warning, current intelligence, and threatassessments. They also recommended developing a process and metrics forassessing infrastructure dependency.

The US armed forces' focus on the development of a high-technology fightingforce, known as Force XXI for the army and listed under varying names for theother services. Army testing at the National Training Center in the Spring of1997 yielded significant results that appear to have placed the development andfielding of IT systems ahead of schedule. The only criticism to direct againstthe army's approach is that it has somewhat neglected the psychological impactof IT on the soldier.

The US military, like Russia, is also pursuing the use of virtual realitymechanisms to create artificial battlefields and work on potential problems inadvance. Known as the Joint Training Confederation (JTC), 12 interacting systems(such as the Air Warfare Simulation [AWSIM]; the Corps Battle Simulation [(CBS];and the Navy's Research, Evaluation and System Analysis Simulation [RESAJ) weredeveloped to train military forces of the US all over the world.

US research and development in the field of IT is focused on many items. Dr.Alvin H. Bernstein of the National Defense University divided technologies intopop-up (those that can distinguish threatening objects from decoys and then hidein their own signature) and fire-ant (the fiercely

stinging, omnivorous side of technology). He listed "pop-up" as signatures,platforms, stealth, drones, loitering missiles, autonomous land crawlers, andsubmersibles, and "fire-ant" as sensors, emitters microbots, mini-projectiles,miniaturization, and integrated software.³⁶Thus, the implication is that core research and development strategies mustfocus on electronics, nanotechnologies, energy, software that emphasizesintegration, and manufacturing technology to produce counter-stealth technology,automatic target recognition capabilities, robotics, non-lethal weapons, andrapid power projection capabilities.

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES FOR US-RUSSIAN COOPERATION ININFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES

The Russian Draft Doctrine on Information Security indicated great interestin developing cooperation with other nations in the area of information securityand technology. The doctrine notes that

... international cooperation on questions of ensuring informationsecurity is an indispensable component of the political, military, economic,cultural, and other forms of interaction of countries participating in theworld community. Such cooperation should promote an increase in theinformation security of all members of the world community, including theRussian Federation.³⁷

While it is unknown if the President's Commission on Critical InfrastructureProtection suggests cooperation or not, the US Defense Science Board report didnot mention it. Cooperation is significant on a non-governmental level, however.For example, when Bill Gates, founder and President of Microsoft, visited Moscowin 1997, he discussed several cooperative ventures with his Russian hosts. Hisagenda included intellectual property rights and copyrights, and the use ofMicrosoft products in the Russian space agency, Central Bank, and variousindustrial companies. In an agreement with LUKOIL, a Russian oil conglomerate,it was decided to sign a general agreement defining a strategy for mutualcooperation.³⁸

Governmental cooperation between the US and Russia in IT has moved moreslowly. While there have been limited meetings at the highest levels to discusssome of these problems, there has been a heavy reluctance by the Pentagon andothers to provide momentum to the process. Perhaps the Pentagon is in no hurryto share IW information because they are uncertain of tomorrow's geo-strategicarrangement. The fall of the USSR appeared to happen overnight, after all. Onthe other hand, any risk of giving away valuable information nearly hasdissipated due to the vast amount of IW-related information available to thepublic. To date, well over 500 articles have been written by US analysts andscientists about US information systems and operations. Russians have beenescorted to demonstrations of US advanced information-based and -supportedartillery systems and even been briefed on information operations plans for a UStheater.

While a variety of options exist, limited discussions do deserve to beexplored in more detail, perhaps in a conference setting. Nuclear agediscussions that proved so beneficial underscore the necessity of changing thisreluctance. If computer viruses attack critical systems in the future, andappear to come from a state, when in reality an individual has sent the virus,will Russia and America launch nuclear weapons, as one Russian indicated theirside would, because the sides didn't talk to one another? Without dialogue, thepotential for improving global security is undermined. By failing to worktogether in the management of IT, misunderstanding and fear are encouraged.

Opportunities now exist for dialogue, but such operations may become evenmore limited over time if suspicion builds. Russia's willingness to discussthese issues is tied to its domestic and economic situation. There are manyconservatives in Russia, as in the US government, who still see a US footprint(and vice versa, Russian) on every issue under discussion today. Some believethat a massive information operation has already been conducted against Russia.On the other hand, there currently are scores of well-informed Russian leaders,academicians and analysts who do not see an American conspiracy everywhere theylook, want to exchange opinions, and can offer a tremendous representativesampling of expertise on all areas of information technology and theory.

Yet another reason for dialogue is the number of ties that Russia maintainswith so-called rogue states (Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and so forth). Russia maybe best positioned to help control non-state sponsored sources of informationterrorism. This could only help America, which is the number one enemy of mostof these states. On the other hand, some fear that Russia would share USconversations on these topics with these states. Another fear is that roguemembers of Russian society (willing to sell secrets to the highest bidder) maybe an even greater threat. However, this may be a moot point if 90 per cent ofthis information is already available for public consumption.

Neither side can afford to wait much longer. New technologies are continuallyappearing that may make the future even more difficult to manage and unstable.The US is awaiting the arrival of asynchronous transfer mode (ATM) systems,which will revolutionize the way soldiers communicate. As one recent discussionconcluded:

What will technology provide during the next century? Is itquantum computing? Is it molecular or DNA computing? ... The key question is:what technologies, if any, will complement and/or replace the predictablesilicon technology.³⁹

Quantum computing uses the principle of superconductivity to increase thespeed of computing and to reduce the heat that arises from millions ofprocessing procedures (even small amounts of heat affect chips where size ismeasured in fractions of a micron). One Russian scientist working in America andsharing his discoveries in the field of quantum computing with his Russiancolleagues estimated that by the year 2010 it will be possible to pack 64trillion transistors on a chip instead of the 1995 figure of 64 million.⁴⁰Clearly, this spiral will continue unchecked. It would only be prudentfor both sides to establish a dialogue as soon as possible.

The use of IT has caused significant changes in the armed forces of bothcountries. General William Hartzog, commanding general of the US Army Trainingand Doctrine Command (TRADOC), reflecting on these changes, commented during theTask Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment exercises at the NationalTraining Center that:

I don't think I've been involved in 34 years in anything evenclosely approaching this ... I don't think we have ever had as large, complexor holistic a look at things. There are lessons that we will pick out fromthis that we woulf have never seen in any other kind of exercise orexperiment...⁴¹

The armed forces of both Russia and the US have weighed carefully the impactof IT on their operations, as the discussion above indicates. They are alsomonitoring the impact of IT on the security interests of their respectivestates, and adjusting policy and organizational arrangements accordingly.However, keeping pace with rapid advancements in IT will be a continuous anddifficult proposition.

One of the ways to bring about an understanding of IT's impact on thecivilian and military components of both countries, and at the same time lowerthe fears associated with technological advancements, is to develop an agendafor cooperation. The discussion above suggests several areas that requireimmediate attention.

First, both sides need to develop a common terminology in order to discusswith both precision and understanding the meaning and impact of IT on military-pol iti cal affairs. This should be the simplest phase for cooperation but, aspeace operations have shown, it may be one of the most difficult. It took overthree years for the two countries to develop a set of definitions to explainRussian and US concepts of peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace making.Today, these definitions are continuing to undergo change and modification, andthere is no coordinating mechanism to update them. This only encouragesmisunderstanding. Without a doubt, Russian and US policy makers need to come toa common understanding of IT and IW terms. Otherwise, how will the sides be ableto cooperate on, say, computer crime without unwittingly violating a legal issuefor the other side?

Second, there must be an agenda to institutionalize the legal norms for notjust Russia and the US but for all nations regarding IT and IW. What wouldconstitute an information attack? What are the cyberspace borders that a countrycan consider as violations of sovereignty? What is considered to be IT theft incyberspace? Are there IT developments that should be curbed or limited, andincluded in an IT non-proliferation agreement? There are literally hundreds ofsuch questions to answer.

Third, an IT/information operations hot line should be established. The needfor such a line was evident a few years ago when a student in St. Petersburgbroke into the computer data base of Citicorps Bank and stole millions ofdollars. As is well known, many such attacks go unreported today because banksdo not want their clientele to know that their system is not 100 per cent safe.If this hacking occurs in the nuclear codes of either side, then the scale andconsequence of the problem increases substantially. An information hot linewould allow immediate notification between the two countries of a seriousproblem.

Fourth, discussions on the impact of IT on the military art of Russia and theUS, especially in the areas of greatest concern (for example, the Russianunderstanding of the boundaries of the initial period of war), would be aninvaluable undertaking. A good place to start work on this issue would beprivate military-political discussions or even a conference at the highestlevels. Both sides could express their concerns and fears to sensitize oneanother to the impact of new IT developments on their national securitypolicies. Such cooperation can only help reduce the likelihood ofmisunderstanding and can quickly move important concerns to the top of theagenda. It will no longer be an excuse to admit if only I had known what myaction meant to you.

Fifth, it is important to recognize that soon both sides will have theability to use holograms and other IT manifestations that will offer theopportunity to completely fool one another both on the battlefield and throughthe airwaves, whether it be TV or radio, and the press. Both sides should begininitial discussions on these issues before they are overtaken by rapidlychanging technological developments. A hacker simulating an incoming ICBMnuclear attack on the radar screens of the military of either Russia or theUnited States is but one manifestation of this threat.

Finally, both Russia and the United States should have advisors sit togetherand discuss two documents: the Russian Federation Draft Doctrine on InformationSecurity and the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.The sides could discuss areas of concern and potential cooperation. Both nationsshould learn a great deal from such a process.

This chapter has focused on US-Russian bilateral relations. Certainly,US-Russian decisions concerning IT will influence other nations and vice-versa.These suggestions for expanding US-Russian bilateral cooperation in IT couldeasily be extended to include other nations. This is not only advisable, butnecessary, as nations approach the interdependent security environment of thetwenty-first century.

ENDNOTES

1. Information technology (IT) is defined as all aspects ofmanaging and processing information, and is characterized by the domain andtools of its usage. Two major components of IT remain hardware and software butIT's tasks, constantly being redefined, include processing, operating systems,network operating systems, data communication standards, high-speedcommunications, networking applications, the Internet, object-orientedtechnologies, and database technologies. This definition is provided by TheCenter for Research in Electronic Commerce (CREC, University of Texas at Austin(1998) (http://cism.bus.utexas.edu/ram/col lab/it.html).

2. Some of the more important US works on information warinclude George Stein, "Information Warfare," Airpower Journal (Spring1995), pp. 3139; John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, "Cyberwar is Coming,"Comparative Strategy, No. 12 (1993), pp. 141-65; and Martin C. Libicki,What is Information Warfare? (Washington DC: Center for AdvancedConcepts and Technology, Institute for National Strategic Studies, NationalDefense University, 1995). Important Russian works on information warfareinclude Vladimir S. Pirumov, "Several Aspects of Information Warfare," paperpresented at InfoWarCon 1996 entitled "Defining the European Perspective" (23-24May 1996), Brussels, Belgium; V. I. Tsymbal, "Concept of Information Warfare,"Academy of State Management, Moscow, Russia (14 September 1995); and A. A.Prokhozhev and N. I. Turko, "The Basics of Information Warfare," reportpresented at the conference entitled "Systems Analysis on the Threshold of the21st Century: Theory and Practice," Moscow, Russia (27-29 February 1996).

3. See Lawrence Freedman, "The First Two Generations of NuclearStrategists," in Peter Paret, ed., Makers of Modern Strategy(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 762.

4. Unless, of course, the information strike is against anuclear plant, causing a melt down and greater damage than a nuclear blast.

5. "New Trends in Power Deterrence," Armeyskiy sbornik,No. 9 (September 1995), pp. 12-19 in FBIS- UMA (17 January 1996),p. 11.

6. Ibid., p. 12.

7. I. Panarin, "Troyanskiy kon XXI veka" (Trojan Horse of the21st century), Krasnaya zvesda (8 December 1995), p. 3.

8. Georgiy Smolyan, Vitaliy Tsygichko and Dmitriy Chereshkin,"A Weapon That May be More Dangerous Than a Nuclear Weapon: The Realities ofInformation Warfare," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye (Supplement toNezavisimaya gazeta), No. 3 (18 November 1995), pp. 1-2 in FBIS-UMA(6 December 1995), pp. 31-35.

9. Aleksandr Pozdnyakov, interviewed by Vladimir Davydov,"Information Security", Granitsa Rossii, No. 33 (September 1995), pp.6-7 in FBIS-UMA (13 December 1995), pp. 41-44.

10. M. Boytsov, "Informatsionnaya voyna" (InformationWarfare), Morskoy sbornik, No. 10 (1995), p. 70.

11. Pozdnyakov, "Information Security," p. 43. These virusesare Trojan horse, forced quarantine, sensor, and overload, and are described inthe article.

12. B.P. Pal'chun and R.M. Yusupov, "Obespecheniyebezopasnosti komp'yutorynoy infosfery" (Providing Security in the ComputerInfosphere), Vooruzheniye, politika, konversiya (Armaments, Policy,Conversion), No. 3 (1993), p. 23.

13. See Timothy L. Thomas, "The Threat of InformationOperations: A Russian Perspective," in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr. and Richard H.Shultz, Jr., eds., War in the Information Age (Washington/London:Brassey's, 1997), pp. 69-73. For further discussion concerning these militaryconsiderations (initial period of war, and so forth) see pp. 61-80.

14. Grigoriy S. Utkin, "Synthetic Environments and VirtualReality: The Russian View," paper presented at the seminar entitled "MilitaryApplications of Synthetic Environments and Virtual Reality" (16-18 September1997), Stockholm, Sweden.

15. John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy ofthe United States of America: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategyfor a New Era (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 9.

16. Ibid., p. 17.

17. Tsymbal, "Concept of Information Warfare."

18. General Dennis J. Reimer, "The Army and the CyberspaceCrossroads," Defense Issues, Vol. 12, No. 33(http://www.dtic.mil/defe...nk/pubs/ di97/dil233.html).

19. "Powerscene: An Overview," Cambridge Research Associates,Inc., McLean, Virginia (November 1995). Also see Timothy L. Thomas, "VirtualPeacemaking: Conflict Prevention Through the Use of Information Technology"(September 1997), paper under consideration for publication inParameters.

20. Douglas Pasternak, "Wonder Weapons," U.S. News andWorld Report (7 July 1997), pp. 38-46.

21. James K. Morningstar, "Technologies, Doctrine andOrganization for the RMA," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1997), pp.37-43.

22. James Schneider, "Black Lights: Chaos, Complexity, and thePromise of Information Warfare," Joint Force Quarterly (Spring 1997),pp. 2628.

23. Robert Steele, "Virtual Intelligence: Conflict Avoidanceand Resolution through Information Peacekeeping," distributed at conferenceentitled "Virtual Diplomacy," US Institute of Peace, Washington DC (2 April1997).

24. Andrew Gilligan, "Army goes to war with platoons ofholograms," The Sunday Telegraph, London (I I May 1997), p. 5.

25. Russian Federation Draft Doctrine on InformationSecurity (13 August 1997) in FBIS-SOV Q September 1997).

26. Aleksey Okhskiy, "FAPSI: Only Powerful Organizations areCapable of the Comprehensive Protection of Information," Sevodnya (8September 1995), p. 3 in FBIS-SOV (28 September 1995), p. 20.

27. Vladimir Markomenko, "Invisible, Drawn-Out War,"Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye (16-21 August 1997), p. 1. Markomenkolists the functions of Russian IW (electronic warfare, electronic surveillance,hacker warfare and psychological warfare) and describes them in thisarticle.

28. A. A. Prokhozhev and N. 1. Turko, "The Basics ofInformation Warfare," report at the conference enitled "Systems Analysis on theThreshold of the 21st Century: Theory and Practice," Moscow (February 1996), p.251.

29. Utkin, "Synthetic Environments and Virtual Reality: TheRussian View," p. 11.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid., p. 12.

32. INTERFAX (14 February 1996) in FBIS-UMA (28February 1996), p. 64.

33. Andrey Fonotov, "Science and Technology Policy,"Rossiyskaya gazeta (8 August 1996), p. 6 in FBIS- UST (8August 1996).

34. Barbara Starr, "U.S. Puzzle Palace Seeks New Clues toCombat Old Threats," Jane's Defense Weekly (3 September 1997), pp.35-36.

35. "Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force onInformation Warfare-Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense forAcquisition and Technology," Washington DC (November 1996).

36. Alvin H. Bernstein, "Conflict and Technology: The NextGeneration," National Defense University, unpublished paper.

37. Russian Federation Draft Doctrine on InformationSecurity.

38. Stanislav Leonidov and Denis Kirillov, "MicrosoftIncreases Pressure on Russian Market," Moskovskiye Finansovyye Izvestiya (14October 1997), p. I in FBIS-SOV (9 January 1998).

39. Juris Hartmanis, "Roundtable: The Future of Computing andTelecommunications," Issues in Science and Technology (Spring 1997), p.72.

40. Vladimir Pokrovskiy, "A Russian Scientist is Making aQuantum Computer but No One Knows in America or Here," Obshchaya gazeta(30 October-5 November 1997), No. 43, p. 14 in FBIS-SOV (9 January1998).

41. Dennis Steele, "AWE: Testing Soldiers and Equipment," Army(June 1997), p. 28.